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THE NUCLEAR CHOICE: ARE HEALTH AND SAFETY 
ISSUES PRE-EMPTED? 
George B. Henderson, II* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The past decade has witnessed a marked demand for more com-
prehensive regulation by state governments of the electric power 
industry. What type of power plant to build and where to locate it 
are questions that the public is no longer content to leave in the 
hands of the private utility companies. The result has been the en-
actment by many states of power plant siting laws. 1 These laws 
generally confer on a regulatory body, usually a specially created 
siting agency, the authority to determine whether there is a need 
for the generating facility, whether the type of power plant pro-
posed is the most suitable, and whether the proposed location is 
the best among available alternatives.-
• Staff member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 As of 1977 a total of twenty-four of the fifty states had enacted siting laws. For a compi-
lation of these laws, see OFFICE OF STATE PLANNING PROGRAMS, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM-
MISSION, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT, IMPROVING REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS IN FEDERAL/ 
STATE SITING ACTIONS (NUREG-OI95)(May, 1977) [hereinafter cited as NRC STAFF FED-
ERAL/STATE SmNG STUDY]. 
• Most of the modern siting Jaws are what are commonly referred to as "one-stop" siting 
laws under which all the various elements of the state's regulatory authority are brought 
together to make a single decision. Before a utility company may construct a power plant it 
must first apply to the siting agency for a certificate of approval, sometimes called a certifi-
cate of public convenience and neceBSity. The administering agency generally conducts one 
or more public hearings, usually employing the legal rules of discovery and cross-examina-
tion, after which a pre-construction certificate of approval is issued or denied. Appellate 
review is available through the state courts. In determining the location of a proposed facil-
ity, the siting law may require a fairly routine administrative procedure conducted by the 
appropriate agency, or it may entail more extensive planning of the sort required by the 
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To a large extent these laws are a response to the controversy 
over the development of the nuclear power industry, and they con-
stitute a major source of state regulatory control over nuclear 
power plant construction. Since the nuclear industry has histori-
cally been regulated largely by the federal government, the states' 
entrance into this field has created areas of potential conflict where 
the state and federal regulatory schemes overlap. On the one hand 
the Atomic Energy Act of 19548 confers jurisdiction on the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) to regulate through the licensing 
process practically all aspects of nuclear power that relate to radia-
tion hazards, including power plant design, construction and oper-
ation, and transportation of nuclear materials.· On the other hand 
California Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission which requires 
that three sites be submitted for comparison. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25503 (West 1977). In 
Maryland the analysis, evaluation and acquisition of sites are all conducted by the state. 
MD. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 3-305 (Michie 1977). 
A number of states require the long-range plans of utilities to be made public, including a 
five to fifteen year forecast of electric demand and proposed construction and capacity plans 
to meet that demand. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 164, § 691 (West Supp. 1979). This 
approach seeks to avoid large commitments of resources to a particular site before final 
approval is given. See generally, NRC STAFF FEDERAL/STATE SITING STUDY, supra note 1 at 
3-1 through 3-15. 
The issuance of the certificate of approval may be conditioned on a number of findings. 
The relevant portions of the Wisconsin siting law are set out here as an example. 
d) The application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity shall be ap-
proved if the commission determines that: 
1. The proposed facility is in substantial compliance with the most recent advance 
plan filed under sub. (2) and approved by the commission under subsection (2)(i), except 
the commission may waive the requirement of this subdivision for large electric generat-
ing facilities or high-voltage transmission lines if it finds that the need for the facilities 
or lines could not have been reasonably foreseen by the utility at the time of the filing of 
its most recent advance plan approved by the commission. 
2. The proposed facility is necessary to satisfy the reasonable needs of the public for 
an adequate supply of electric energy. 
3. The design and location or route is in the public interest considering alternative 
sources of supply, alternative locations or routes, individual hardships, engineering, eco-
nomic, safety, reliability, and environmental factors. 
4. The proposed facility will not have undue adverse impact on other environmental 
values such as, but not limited to, ecological balance, public health and welfare, historic 
sites, geological formations, the aesthetics of land and water and recreational use. 
5. The proposed facility complies with the criteria under § 196.49(4) if the applica-
tion is by a public utility as defined in § 196.01. 
6. The proposed facility will not unreasonably interfere with the orderly land use and 
development plans for the area involved. 
WIS. STAT. § 196.491(3) (West Supp. 1979). 
• 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976). 
• 42 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2140 (1976). A number of steps are necessary before a utility company 
can construct and operate a nuclear power plant. Under the Atomic Energy Act the utility 
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most state siting laws direct the administering agency to consider, 
in making its decision whether to authorize construction, all the 
relevant aspects of the proposed plant, including the economic, en-
vironmental, and health and safety impacts. It is in the considera-
tion of the last mentioned criteria-the health and safety im-
pacts-that the two regulatory schemes overlap and the 
boundaries between federal and state authority become blurred.· 
The potential federal-state conflict becomes apparent in the 
hearing before a state siting agency on an application for a certifi-
cate of approval to construct a nuclear power plant. It manifests 
itself in what is essentially an evidentiary issue. Faced with de-
mands by public interest intervenors that evidence of the radiation 
hazards of nuclear power be admitted into the record-and the in-
evitable objection to such demands by the applicant-the hearing 
officer must decide whether the admission of such evidence consti-
tutes a state "regulation" of nuclear power that is irreconcilable 
with federal authority over radiation hazards. If indeed the state 
regulation is irreconcilable with federal law the supremacy of fed-
erallaw over state law under the United States ConstitutionS man-
dates that the evidence be excluded. The hearing officer's resolu-
must obtain separate licenses at both the construction and operation stage. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2133, 2232, 2235, 2239 (1976). In order to obtain a construction permit, the company must 
submit an application which includes, among other things, a preliminary safety analysis re-
port and an environmental report. See generally 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.101, 50.30(0, 5O.34(a) 
(1980). The NRC staff reviews the application, obtains any needed additional information 
and resolves any unsolved questions with the applicant. The NRC staff also prepares its 
own draft environmental impact statement, pursuant to the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976) (NEPA), which, after being circulated for com-
ment, is revised and becomes a final environmental impact statement. 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.22-
51.26 (1980). 
The application is submitted to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), 
an independent body of experts in the atomic energy field. After an informal hearing with 
the applicant the ACRS submits its report to the NRC, which report becomes part of the 
utility's application. 10 C.F.R. § 50.58 (1980). Thereupon formal adjudicatory hearings are 
conducted before the three member Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 
2239 (1976). The Board's decision can be appealed to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Ap-
peal Board, and, in the Commission's discretion, to the Commission itself. The final decision 
may be appealed to the courts of appeals. 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (1976). 
A similar process occurs when the utility applies for a license to operate the plant, except 
that a hearing need only be held in contested cases and may be limited to matters in contro-
versy. See 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a); 10 C.F.R. § 2.105; 10 C.F.R. Part 2, App. A, V (1980). 
• In practice, the regulatory activities also overlap with respect to economic and environ-
mental considerations. However, these areas of overlap have no effect on state authority. See 
generally text at notes 34-41, infra. 
• U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1. See generally text at Part II infra. 
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tion of the issue thus requires the application of the doctrine of 
federal pre-emption,7 the legal doctrine that determines the cir-
cumstances under which a federal law will be found to pre-empt 
state law. 
In this context the pre-emption issue is a narrow one, but, as 
hardly needs stating, can be broad in its impact. The failure to 
consider the radiation hazards of the proposed plant will not result 
in a properly balanced state decision. Furthermore, recent develop-
ments in the nuclear power industry make it evident that the ad-
missibility of such evidence is increasingly likely to be determina-
tive of the state agency's ultimate decision whether to authorize 
construction. One of the most obvious developments is the impact 
of the Three Mile Island accident and the report of the Kemeny 
Commission. The blow to the credibility of NRC determinations 
resulting from the Kemeny Report will undoubtedly make state 
regulatory agencies far more inquisitive into health and safety 
matters, and far less willing to fall back on the pre-emption doc-
trine as a means of avoiding examination of the health and safety 
issue. Another factor is the rapid increase in the cost of nuclear 
power plant construction and operation, and the increasing cost 
and decreasing availability of nuclear fuel.8 As the difference in 
cost between nuclear and coal-fired generation decreases, a finding 
that nuclear power poses a significant threat to the health and 
safety of the public is more likely to tip the balance away from 
nuclear power. Thus as long as the scope of federal pre-emption in 
this area remains undefined, it can be expected that the issue will 
continue to arise, and with increasing importance. 
Because the admissibility of evidence regarding radiation 
hazards may ultimately be determinative of a siting agency's deci-
sion, the failure to consider the evidence tends to leave much of 
the policy-making with respect to nuclear power plant construction 
7 See text at Part II infra. 
• In a 1977 opinion, the Wisconsin Public Service Commission stated: "There is a wide 
range of views in this record concerning the relative economics of nuclear and coal-fired 
generation. These views range from nuclear power's being much less costly than coal to 
coal's being much less costly than nuclear, and include the view that it is impossible to tell 
.... " Advance Plans for Construction of Facilities, No. 05-EP-1, Pub. Servo Comm'n of 
Wise., 2 Nuc. RBG. RBP. (CCH) 16,562, 16,564 (11 20,093) (1978) [hereinafter cited as Ad-
vance Plans]. 
The cost of nuclear fuel has soared from $8 a pound in 1972 to more than $50. There are 
indications that there will be shortages of high-grade uranium in the 1980's. What Next for 
Nuclear Power-the Kemeny Report, U.S. News & World Report, Nov. 12, 1979, 33, 35. 
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in the hands of the NRC. The problem thus poses important ques-
tions concerning the allocation of power between the states and the 
federal government in the area of electric energy policy. Is the 
NRC properly authorized to decide what type of power plant is 
best for a particular region and, if so, is it empowered to do so to 
the exclusion of the states? Conversely, can a state refuse to au-
thorize construction of a nuclear power plant on the grounds that 
it is more hazardous than some other alternative? 
With these broader questions in mind, this article examines the 
scope of the NRC's regulatory jurisdiction under the Atomic En-
ergy Act in order to determine its proper effect on state siting laws. 
At the outset, a brief history of federal regulation of commercial 
nuclear power plants is set forth, and the cases that have dealt 
with the pre-emption issue in this area are reviewed. Next, an ex-
amination of the doctrine of federal pre-emption will be con-
ducted, focussing on the legal principles as they have been devel-
oped by the Supreme Court. Since the application of the pre-
emption doctrine turns largely on the intent of Congress, the 
Atomic Energy Act and other pertinent federal legislation are ex-
amined to discern how far Congress has sought to extend its power 
over regulation of nuclear power. Some policy questions are also 
explored to determine whether it is appropriate to "imply" an in-
tent on the part of Congress to pre-empt the field. Finally, a con-
clusion having been reached, the practical problems of what types 
of evidence may be admitted into the state siting agency's hearing 
are discussed and some solutions offered. 
II. FEDERAL REGULATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
A. Historical Background 
After the close of World War II, Congress in 1946 transferred 
control over the development of atomic energy from the military to 
a civilian agency.9 The Atomic Energy Act of 194610 established 
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and vested in it exclusive 
ownership of all fissionable material and related facilities.ll The 
• See generally, Miller, A Law is Passed-The Atomic Energy Act of 1946,15 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 799 (1948). 
'0 The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755, (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2011-2296 (1976». 
11 [d. ch. 724, §§ 4(c)(I), 5(a)(2), 60 Stat. 759, 760. Minor exceptions were made in the 
case of facilities producing shall amounts of fissionable material. [d. § (4)(c)(I)(A), (B), 60 
Stat. 759. 
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role of private industry was limited to activities conducted pursu-
ant to government contract,12 thus maintaining in the government 
a virtual monopoly over the atomic energy industry.13 
In 1954 the Act was overhauled so as to allow private industry to 
participate in the development and utilization of atomic energy for 
peaceful purposes.H The Act's stated policy was to "encourage 
widespread participation in the development and utilization of 
atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the maximum extent con-
sistent with the common defense and security and with the health 
and safety of the public."lII The AEC was authorized to issue li-
censes for the possession or use of special nuclear material,16 and 
for the ownership, possession and use of utilization and production 
facilities. 17 The Act assigned to the AEC the dual role of both reg-
ulating and promoting the atomic energy industry; thus its licens-
ing and related regulatory duties were closely linked with its non-
regulatory responsibilities of assisting and promoting research and 
development of atomic power. IS The Commission was given exten-
11 [d. ch. 724 § 4(c)(2). 
IS See Murphy & La Pierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation in the States and the 
Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Pre-emption, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 394-95 (1976) 
[hereinafter cited as Murphy & La Pierre) . 
.. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919, as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-
2296 (1976) [hereinafter cited as the 1954 Act). 
to [d. ch. 1073, § 3(d), 68 Stat. 922, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2013(d) (1976). 
18 [d. ch. 1073, § 1, 68 Stat. 930, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2073 (1976). Special nuclear 
material is defined under the Act to include enriched uranium, plutonium, and "any other 
material which the Commission ... determines to be special nuclear material," but not 
including source material (uranium, thorium or ores thereof). [d. ch. 1073, § l1(t), (s), 68 
Stat. 922, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2014(aa), (z) (1976). 
17 [d. ch. 1073, § 101, 68 Stat. 936, as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2133 (1976). A utiliza-
tion facility is defined as "any equipment or device, except an atomic weapon, determined 
by rule of the Commission to be capable of making use of special nuclear material in such 
quantity as to be of significance to the common defense and security, or in such manner as 
to affect the health and safety of the public ... " [d. ch. 1073, § l1(v), 68 Stat. 922, as 
amended 42 U.S.C. § 2014(cc) (1976). The term "production facility" is defined in almost 
precisely the same words. [d. ch. 1073, § l1(p), 68 Stat. 922, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2014(v) 
(1976). 
18 See generally, E. STASON, S. ESTEP, W. PIERCE, ATOMS AND THE LAW, 1245 (1959) [here-
inafter cited as ATOMS AND THE LAW). See also text at note 116 infra. In 1974 the AEC was 
abolished and two separate agencies, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the 
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) were established 'to perform 
those functions largely independently of each other. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 
Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1976) (see text at note 
172, infra.) ERDA's functions were subsequently transferred to the Department of Energy. 
Department of Energy Reorganization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 577 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7151-7352, 7172 (West Supp. 1978). 
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sive rulemaking authority to regulate atomic energy in order "to 
promote the common defense and security or to protect health or 
to minimize danger to life or property."t9 
As the use of atomic energy in the private sector increased, some 
states began enacting statutes regulating atomic energy for health 
and safety purposes.IO In order to clarify the respective roles of the 
federal government and the states, and to allow the states to regu-
late in the field, Congress in 1959 amended the Atomic Energy Act 
to allow states to enter into agreements with the AEC under which 
the state could regulate certain specified areas of nuclear energy.lt 
The regulation of nuclear power plants, however, was not one of 
these areas, and the AEC retained exclusive jurisdiction over "the 
construction and operation of any production or utilization facil-
ity" pursuant to the provisions of the 1954 Act.11 
Under the 1954 Act, as amended, the AEC's regulatory activities 
extended to areas of design and construction, emissions standards, 
qualifications of operations personnel, and other matters that con-
cerned the ability of the plant to protect against radiation 
hazards. IS Prior to issuing a construction permit the AEC was re-
quired to find: (1) that there is reasonable assurance that the 
health and safety of the public will not be endangered, (2) that the 
applicant is technically and financially qualified to engage in the 
proposed activities, and (3) that the issuance of the license to the 
applicant will not be inimical to the common defense and security 
or to the health and safety of the public. I. 
Despite the rather pervasive regulatory control that the AEC ex-
ercised over the special hazards associated with the operation of 
nuclear facilities, its jurisdiction did not extend to environmental, 
economic and other non-nuclear considerations. These areas were 
left to the control of other federal or state agencies, or, as was 
often the case, to the control 'of the utility companies and the mar-
ket.16 The narrow scope of the AEC's jurisdiction as vested by the 
11 1954 Act, ch. 1073, § 161(b), 68 Stat. 948, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b) (1976) . 
• 0 E.g., Cal. Gen. Industry Safety Orders, Cal. Stats 1955, ch. 1868, p. 3464 (1955) (current 
version at CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 25600-25610 (West 1967). See generally, ATOMS 
AND THE LAW, supra note 18, at 880-912 (1959) . 
• , Act of September 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, 73 Stat. 688, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 
2021 (1976). 
u 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976) . 
•• [d. §§ 2131-2140. See generally, ATOMS AND THE LAW, supra note 18 at 1207-1315 . 
•• 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133(b), 2133(d) (1976); see also, 10 C.F.R. § 50.40 (1980). 
•• The Office of Science and Technology described the AEC's licensing jurisdiction as 
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Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, was illustrated in New 
Hampshire v. AEC.18 There the State of New Hampshire chal-
lenged the issuance of a provisional construction permit on the 
grounds that the AEC had improperly refused to consider the ef-
fects of thermal pollution resulting from the discharge of cooling 
water into the Connecticut River. In affirming the issuance of the 
permit the court held that the Atomic Energy Act gave the AEC 
jurisdiction to regulate only for the purpose of protecting against 
radiation hazards, and that regulation in other areas of environ-
mental hazards were properly left to other federal and state agen-
cies.1I7 The court deferred to the AEC's interpretation of the 
Atomic Energy Act, which limited the Act's references to "the 
health and safety of the public" to matters confined to radiation 
hazards.18 
As the New Hampshire decision illustrates, the AEC's regulatory 
duties were designed to protect the public from a specific danger 
and did not encompass the broader problems of the public interest 
as a whole. This approach to power plant licensing may be con-
trasted to another area of federal licensing activity-the Federal 
Power Commission's regulatory control over hydroelectric power 
follows: 
Licensing of a nuclear plant by the AEC does not relieve the applicant from being sub-
ject to the same appropriate federal, state, or local jurisdiction on matters such as zon-
ing, aesthetics, land acquisition, and the thermal and other nonradiological effects as for 
fOBBil fueled power plants. However, the AEC believes that the Atomic Energy Act re-
flects CongreBBional intent that the control of radiation hazards from production and 
utilization facilities, including nuclear power plants and the discharge of radioactive ef-
fects from such power plants, be the exclusive responsibility of the federal government. 
ENERGY POLICY STAPF OUICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOQY, ELECTRIC POWER AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT, reprinted in Proposed Power Plant Siting Act of 1971: Hearings on S. 1684, S. 
1915, S. 3631, before the Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 886, 904 (1972). The 
AEC described its jurisdiction in a similar light: 
The [Atomic Safety and Licensing) [B)oard considers matters of radiological safety 
involved in the application for this proposed reactor at the selected site. However, it has 
no jurisdiction to consider possible thermal effects from discharge of heated water from 
the plant, the effect construction of the facility might have on conservation or on aes-
thetics, zoning or similar questions. These matters remain within the purview of the fed-
eral, state or local government agencies which also would be involved if the facility were 
a fOBBil-fueled plant. 
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, LICENSING OF POWER REACTORS, reprinted in 
Hearings before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy on Licensing and Regulation of Nu-
clear Reactors, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. I, 291 (1967) . 
•• 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1969) . 
.. Id. at 175-76 . 
•• Id. at 175. 
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plants. Ie Under the Federal Power Act of 192080 Congress gave the 
Federal Power Commission (FPC) sweeping authority and a plan-
ning responsibility.81 Section 10(a) of the Act states that a license 
for the construction of a plant shall be issued upon the condition 
that it be found that the project will be "best adapted to a compre-
hensive plan for improving or developing a waterway."81 The Act 
thus imposes on the FPC an affirmative duty to inquire into and 
consider all relevant factors in making its decision whether the 
project sought to be licensed is in the public interest.88 
In 1971 the AEC was thrust into this same type of comprehen-
sive decision-making process by the landmark decision, Calvert 
Clit/s' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC.84 By holding that the 
AEC was required to strictly comply with the requirements of the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),aa the case had the re-
.. In 1977 the functions of the Federal Power Commission relating to hydroelectric li-
censes and permits were transferred to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission within 
the Department of Energy. Department of Energy Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 
Stat. 577 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7151-7352 (West Supp. 1979). For the purposes of this 
article the Commission's former title will be retained . 
.. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-823 (1976) . 
• , See, First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946). In 
First Iowa the Court held that the comprehensive scheme of federal regulatory control over 
hydroelectric power left no room for conflicting state licensing requirements. 328 U.S. 180-
81. The Court based its holding on the breadth of regulatory jurisdiction that Congreu had 
conferred on the Federal Power Commission: 
[The Federal Power Act] was the outgrowth of the widely supported effort of the conser-
vationists to secure enactment of a complete scheme of national regulation which would 
promote the comprehensive development of the water resources of the Nation, in 80 far 
as it was within the reach of the federal power to do so, instead of the piecemeal, restric-
tive, negative approach of the River and Harbor Acts and other federal laws previously 
enacted. 
328 U.S. at 180. 
H Section 10(a) reads in part: 
[T]he project adopted, ... shall be such as in the judgment of'the Commission will be 
best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway or water-
ways for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement and 
utilization of water-power development, and for other beneficial public uses, including 
recreational purposes; and if neceuary in order to secure such plan the Commiuion shall 
have the authority to require the modification of any project and of the plans and speci-
fications of the project works before approval. 
16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1976). 
H Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n. 354 F.2d 608 (2d 
Cir. 1965), cert. denied 384 U.S. 941 (1966) ("The totality of a project's immediate and long-
range effects, not merely the engineering and navigation aspects are to be considered in a 
licensing proceeding.") Id. at 620. 
M 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) . 
.. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976). The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
(NEPA) is designed to ensure that "presently unquantified environmental amenities and 
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suIt of extending the AEC licensing process into areas beyond the 
scope of jurisdiction created by the Atomic Energy Act. The AEC 
(now the NRC) must now, as a result of Calvert Cliffs, "take the 
initiative of considering environmental values. "88 Furthermore, as 
a result of further administrative interpretations of NEP A, the 
NRC must also make the "need for power" determination of the 
type traditionally made at the state level. 8'1 An important decision, 
Calvert Cliffs has nevertheless had the unfortunate result in many 
states of requiring the duplication by the NRC of proceedings con-
ducted at the state level pursuant to applications for a certificate 
of public convenience and necessity. Neither the decision of the 
NRC nor that of the state agency is legally binding on the other. 
The traditional powers of the state to make the "need for power" 
determinations are preserved under Section 271 of the Atomic En-
ergy Act,88 and the NRC is under no statutory obligation to follow 
values may be given appropriate consideration in decision-making along with economic and 
technical considerations." [d. § 4332(2)(B). 
The Act requires all federal agencies to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for 
"every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal ac-
tions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." [d. § 4332(2)(c). 
The Environmental Impact Statement consists of . . . a detailed statement by the re-
sponsible official on-
(i) The environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal 
be implemented, 
(iii) Alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) The relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and 
(v) Any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be in-
volved in the proposed action should it be implemented . 
.. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1971) . 
.. Niagra Mohawk Power Corp., 3 ATOM. EN. L. REP. (CCH) 17,817 (1111,709.04) (1974); 
see generally, NRC STAFF FEDERAL/STATE SITING ACTIONS, supra note 1 at 5-1. 
NEP A has also resulted in extending the scope of NRC licensing requirements to pre-
construction activities. Prior to NEPA, a license was required before the applicant could 
begin construction of the plant itself. Under present regulations the applicant must get a 
license before he undertakes "any clearing of land, excavation or other substantial action 
that would adversely affect the environment of a site." 10 C.F.R. § 50.1O(c) (1980), added, 37 
Fed. Reg. 5748, Mar. 21, 1972 . 
.. 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1976). This section provides: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect the authority or regulations of any 
Federal, State, or local agency with respect to the generation, sale, or transmission of 
electric power produced through the use of nuclear facilities licensed by the Commission: 
Provided, That this section shall not be deemed to confer upon any Federal, State, or 
local agency any authority to regulate, control, or restrict any activities of the 
Commission. 
See also, 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976) (see text at note 149, infra.) In Vermont Yankee Nu-
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the state determination.89 In recent years much of the duplication 
problem has been resolved by the NRC's practice of conducting 
joint hearings with the appropriate state agency.40 Nevertheless, 
commentators have persuasively argued that judicial interpreta-
tions of NEPA have led the NRC into areas traditionally the sub-
ject of state control, and therefore beyond the proper scope of 
inquiry.41 
Aside from the procedural problems of duplicative hearings, the 
impact on state authority of the NRC's licensing activities has 
been mainly in the area of health and safety. Ever since the enact-
ment of the 1954 Act, the AEC and its successor, the NRC have 
been consistent in their position that the Atomic Energy Act pre-
empts any and all state regulation in matters concerned with radi-
ation hazards.42 This position was affirmed in the oft-cited case, 
Northern States Power Co. v. State of Minnesota,48 where it was 
held that states are pre-empted from setting radioactive emmisions 
standards that are more stringent than those set by the AEC.44 
The scope of this decision has been the subject of extensive com-
mentary. Some, limiting its holding to the context of design, safety, 
clear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), the Court stated: 
There is little doubt that under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, state public utility 
commissions or similar bodies are empowered to make the initial decision regarding the 
need for power. -42 U.S.C. § 2021(k). The Commission's prime area of concern in the 
licensing context, on the other hand, is national security, public health, and safety. §§ 
2132, 2133, 2201. 
435 U.S. 550. 
a. Section 104 of the National Environmental Policy Act provides: 
Nothing in section 102 or 103. shall in any way affect the specific statutory obligations of 
any Federal agency (1) to comply with criteria or standards of environmental quality, (2) 
to coordinate or consult with any other Federal or State agency, or (3) to act, or refrain 
from acting contingent upon the recommendations or certification of any other Federal 
or State agency. 
42 U.S.C. § 4334 (1976). 
4. See, Cronin & Turner, Article VIII of the Public Service Law-The Brave New World 
of Power Plant Siting in New York: A Critique and Suggestions for an Alternative Ap-
proach, 42 ALB. L. REV. 537, 575 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Cronin & Turner] . 
.. R. Lowenstein, Impacts of NEPA and Other Court Actions on the Nuclear Option, 
Remarks at the Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., Conference on United States Energy Policy, 
Washington D.C. (Jan. 10, 1977), cited in Cronin & Turner, supra note 40 at 574, n. 147. 
See also, Strauss, The NRC and Plant Siting, 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 96 (1977). 
•• See note 25 supra . 
.. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd per curiam 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). 
44 Northern States has since been overruled in the context of air pollution by the Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7422 (West Supp. 1978), which grant to the 
states the authority to establish emissions standards for radioactive emissions which are 
more stringent than federal standards. See text at note 187 infra. 
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and emmisions standards, find support for a narrow view of pre-
emption. U Others cite the decision in support of the view that a 
state may not prohibit nuclear power if its underlying purpose is 
arguably to protect against" radiation hazards.48 The Northern 
States decision is a classic example of how a case can be cited as 
authority for either a proposition based on a narrow reading of the 
case or one based on a broad reading. At the outset of the opinion 
Judge Matthes states that "the sole issue to be determined is 
whether the federal government, through the United States Atomic 
Energy Commission ... , [has] exclusive authority to regulate the 
radioactive waste releases from nuclear power plants so as to pre-
clude Minnesota from exercising any regulatory authority over the 
release of such discharges .... "47 Later, however, he states his 
broader conclusion that "Congress intended federal occupancy of 
regulations over all radiation hazards except where jurisdiction was 
expressly ceded to the states . . . . "48 
B. The Aftermath of Northern States 
Northern States has become the starting point of analysis in 
subsequent pre-emption cases arising under the Atomic Energy 
Act, and a number of decisions have further refined its holding. In 
cases where a state or local government has attempted to regulate 
the operation of an existing nuclear plant, courts have uniformly 
applied the pre-emption doctrine to invalidate the attempted regu-
lation.49 Since Northern States, only two cases have squarely dealt 
•• E.g., Tribe, California Declines the Nuclear Gamble: Is Such a State Choice Pre-
empted? 7 ECOL. L. Q. 679 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Tribe, California Declines the Nu-
clear Gamble] . 
•• E.g., Note Application of the Pre-emption Doctrine to State Laws Affecting Nuclear 
Power Plants, 62 VA. L. REV. 738 (1976); Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 13. 
n 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971) . 
•• Id. at 1150 . 
•• In In re Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 1 Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH) 16,128 (11 20,018) 
(1975), the Village of Buchanan refused to issue a zoning variance for the construction of a 
cooling tower system. The plant had been constructed prior to the adoption of the zoning 
law, and under NRC orders the operators had to either build the cooling system or shut 
down. The court held that the town's denial of the variance was pre-empted on the ground 
that it interfered with federal regulatory control of nuclear power plants. In United States v. 
City of New York, 463 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. N.Y. 1978), where the City of New York sought to 
prohibit the operation of Columbia University's nuclear reactor due to possible dangers 
from accidents, the court held that the city's licensing restrictions constituted a regulation 
of plant operation from the standpoint of radiation hazards and were therefore pre-empted. 
And in Van Dissel v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 152 N.J. Super. 391, 377 A.2d 1244 
(1977), the plaintiff alleged tort damages for injury to his dock, claiming that the discharge 
- ~- ---~ -----
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with situations where a state has asserted some form of regulatory 
control prior to the construction of a nuclear power plant. In Mar-
shall v. Consumers Power Co., ao the plaintiff sought a declaration 
of rights that the defendant's proposed power plant would consti-
tute a common law nuisance because of the steam fog and icing 
that would result from the plant's cooling towers. The court held 
that the claim was not barred by federal pre-emption because it 
involved matters not concerned with regulation of radiation 
hazards. al The court stated: 
The license granted by the AEC is merely a permit to construct a 
power plant, not a federal order to do so. Therefore, a state which, 
pursuant to its Atomic Energy Act power to regulate nonradioactive 
hazards, stopped a power company from operating until it met reason-
able state standards or abated a nuisance under state law could not be 
frustrating a federal mandate.1II 
However, in a subsequent part of the opinion, the court stated: 
"[i]f [abatement] measures made the construction of a nuclear 
plant impossible, they could not be required. In such a case, the 
Federal interest would prevent state action from absolutely 
prohibiting the construction of nuclear power plants within its 
boundaries. "&3 
A more recent case, Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy 
Comm'n,a4. has considered the validity of section 25524.2 of the 
California Public Resources Code, enacted in 1976. aa Section 
25524.2 provides that no nuclear power plant shall be certified by 
the state commission until it finds that (1) the authorized United 
States agency has approved a technology for disposal of high level 
wastes and (2) the state commission has reported its findings to 
the state legislature, which has the power to disaffirm them. In 
holding the provision invalid, the district court rejected the state's 
of warm water from the nuclear plant's cooling system resulted in his dock being infested 
with shipworms which subsequently destroyed it. In finding pre-emption, the court found 
that the cooling system was an essential part of the radioactive waste discharge system, and 
that to allow the claim for damages would therefore amount to an impermissible state regu-
lation in the area of radiation hazards. See also, State v. New Jersey Central Power and 
Light Co., 69 N.J. 102, 351 A.2d 337 (1976) . 
•• 65 Mich. App. 237, 237 N.W.2d 266 (1975) . 
•• [d. at 247, 237 N.W.2d at 274-75 . 
•• [d. at 259, 237 N.W.2d at 280 . 
•• [d. at 263-64, 237 N.W.2d at 282 . 
.. 472 F. Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1979) . 
•• CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25524.2 (West 1977) (enacted 1976, Cal. Stats., ch. 196 § 1). 
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claim that Section 255~4.2 was enacted for the economic purpose 
of insuring that California would not have to bear the financial risk 
of funding nuclear power plants which might later be shut down 
because of inadequate permanent waste disposal facilities." In-
stead, the court concluded that the disposal of nuclear wastes was 
a matter exclusively reserved to the NRC under Section 274(c) of 
the Atomic Energy Act,fi7 and that therefore the state had no 
power to contradict a NRC determination that the existence of 
such a technology shall not be a condition precedent for the con-
struction of nuclear power plants.18 Furthermore, the court went 
on to hold that the California law "stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress. "19 
Despite these broad applications of the pre-emption doctrine to 
the area of radiation hazards, state facility siting councils have dis-
agreed on the applicability of the doctrine to state siting laws. 
When health and safety evidence has been offered for purposes of 
comparison to alternatives to a proposed nuclear 1llant, state agen-
cies have split on whether consideration of such evidence would 
constitute a regulation of radiation hazards.80 
At least two states have determined that consideration of radio-
logical health and safety is outside their permissible scope of in-
quiry.81 On the other hand, some state agencies have taken the 
contradictory position that such issues are pre-empted by the 
.. 472 F. Supp. 191, 198. 
a? 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) (1976) . 
.. 472 F. Supp. 191, 199. 
n 472 F. Supp. 191, 200 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941». The court 
drew support for this conclusion from First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power 
Comm'n., 328 U.S. 152 (1946) (see text at notes 92 and 140, infra). 
A similar result was reached in Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources 
Conservation and Development Comm'n, No. CV S-78-527-R (April 25, 1980). 
10 Due to the difficulty of obtaining opinions of state regulatory agencies the author has 
been unable to determine how many states have confronted the issue and, except in the few 
instances noted in this paper, what their decisions have been. 
81 In re Iowa Student Public Interest Research Group, 5 ATOM. EN. L. REP. (CCH) 22,674 
(~ 16,624) (1973) (dismissing complaint challenging on grounds of health and safety the ne-
cessity and appropriateness of nuclear power as a future energy source); In re Petition for 
Approval of a Long-Range Forecast Filed by Northeast Nuclear Energy Co., Memorandum 
and Decision on Challenged Contentions Before the Siting Council, EFSC No. 77-17A (Mas-
sachusetts Energy Facility Siting Council, Dec. 8, 1977) (holding evidence of radiological 
impacts of nuclear power plants not admiBBible). The Massachusetts Energy Facility Siting 
Council reached its decision despite explicit language in the Massachusetts Energy Facility 
Siting Act to the effect that "radiation impact" should be one of the factors to be weighed in 
its decision. See MASS. GEN. LAW. ANN. ch. 164, § 691(3) (West Supp. 1979). 
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Atomic Energy Act, while nonetheless admitting such evidence 
into the hearing.6! Other states have allowed the evidence into the 
hearing and have given it various degrees of consideration in the 
decision.63 
•• In re Union Electric Co., Mo. Pub. Servo Comm'n No. 18,117 (March 14, 1975). In that 
case, the Pubic Service Commission of the State of Missouri authorized the construction 
and operation of a nuclear power plant. In its order the commission stated: 
As stated in our Conclusions of Law, we believe the issue of radiological health and 
safety is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government and that we are pre-
empted from considering and passing on this issue. However, because the proposed nu-
clear plant is the first of its kind in the State of Missouri and there is no other agency 
under Missouri law equippE:d to consider the safety aspects, we admitted into the record, 
a substantial amount of information in relation to safety. 
Id. at 29. Notwithstanding its legal conclusions concerning pre-emption, the commission 
found "that the nuclear plant as proposed is safe." Id. at 33. See also Public Interest Re-
search Group of N.J., Inc. V. N.J., 1 Nuc. REG. RPTR. (CCH) 16,374 (II 20,063) (1977); State 
ex rei. Util. Consumers Council V. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 562 S.W. 2d 688 (Mo. 1978), where 
the Missouri Court of Appeals expressed its agreement with the Missouri Public Service 
Commission's finding that "the issue of radiological health and safety is within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the federal government," but nevertheless stated that "[t]he federal govern-
ment regulates how nuclear power plants will be constructed and maintained; the State of 
Missouri regulates whether they will be constructed." 562 S.W.2d 688 at 691, 698-99 (em-
phasis in original). 
e. In Joint Application of Wis. Pub. Servo Corp., 5 ATOM. EN. L. REP. (CCH) 22,691 (II 
16,631) (1975), the Wisconsin Public Service Commission sustained a ruling of the hearing 
examiner admitting evidence on radiological health and safety: 
The Commission is not attempting to formulate any rules or regulations regarding safety 
which is the prohibited practice under the Federal Law. The Commission is not prohib-
ited from inquiring into "the design, safety and reliability" of the plant in order to deter-
mine what effect such a plant will have on the public it is designed to serve. 
For example, the following lines of inquiry appear to have some relevance to the 
proceedings: 
1. Probable cost of future additional safety equipment; 
2. The cost and effectiveness of alternate types of safety equipment; 
3. Effects of alternate safety equipment and future probable safety equipment on the 
reliability of the plant to generate electric power; 
4. The probability of various classes of nuclear accidents and their environmental 
consequences . . . ; 
5. Protection of the plant from acts of sabotage. 
Id. at 22,691-92. 
See also, In re Fla. Power & Light Co., St. Lucie Nuclear Plant No.2: Application for Site 
Certification, Case No. 75-006, Order No. 82 (Dec. 17, 1975) (where the Governor and Cabi-
net of the State of Florida ordered the hearing officer of the former Department of Pollution 
to receive evidence of the radiological health and safety aspects of the proposed plant, as 
required by the Florida Electrjcal Power Plant Siting Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.501-17, 
(West Supp. 1979»; Long Island Lighting Co.-Jamesport Generating Station, Nuclear 
Units 1 and 2, Case No. 80003, Opinion No. 75-32, Opinion and Order on Admissibility in 
Article VIII Proceedings of Evidence on Radiological Health and Safety, N.Y. Dept. of Pub. 
Servo (Nov. 18, 1975) (quoted at length at note 226, infra) [hereinafter cited as Case No. 
80003]; Advance Plans, supra note 8; In re Tariff Filings Under Advice Notice No. 74, 
[1979] UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 52,304 (II 22,786) (1979) (where the New Mexico Public Service 
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In a 1978 decision the Wisconsin Public Service Commission in-
definitely banned the construction of any new nuclear power 
plants with the exception of two plants which were already into 
the certification process." The commission concluded: 
The question of safe and available storage for nuclear wastes, methods 
and cost of decommissioning and availability and cost of nuclear fuel 
in the long term are matters of significant concern. These uncertainties 
are serious enough to lead this commission to suspend the planning or 
application for new nuclear capacity other than Tyrone I and Haven 
1.86 
Although the commission indicated that it had admitted into the 
record substantial amounts of evidence concerning health and 
safety impacts of nuclear power,·· it nevertheless based its decision 
solely on grounds of cost, "declin[ing] to make a finding as to the 
safety or health effects of nuclear generation."·7 The commission 
thereby avoided confronting the question whether the use of such 
evidence in denying approval of an application to construct a nu-
clear plant would be pre-empted. 
As the Wisconsin decision indicates, state agencies are unlikely 
to force the constitutional issue when there are other grounds for 
reaching a decision. Because of the speculative and inexact nature 
of forecasting electric demand and future cost of construction and 
operation, a state agency has a certain amount of flexibility in its 
evaluation of the record as to whether one method of generation is 
likely to be more costly than another,·· or whether a need for the 
plant has been demonstrated. Thus, even though a state agency 
may find nuclear power comparatively unsafe, there is ample room 
for sidestepping the pre-emption issue by denying the application 
solely on grounds of cost or lack of need. 
Commission, in denying the inclusion of costs of construction work in progress (CWIP) to be 
incurred in the construction of three nuclear power plants into the applicant's rate base, 
questioned the prudence of nuclear power in light of the uncertainties demonstrated by the 
Three Mile Island accident. Id. at 52,310). See generally Note, Nuclear Power Plant Siting: 
Additional Reductions in State Authority? 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 439 (1976) . 
.. Advance Plans, supra note 8 at 16,564. These two plants were subsequently denied 
certificates of approval on grounds of cost . 
•• Id. at 16,564 . 
.. Id. at 16,563. The commission's admission of health and safety evidence was in accord 
with its previous decision in Joint Application of Wis. Pub. Servo Corp., 5 ATOM. EN. L. REP. 
(CCH) 22,691 ('II 16,631) (1975) (discussed at note 63 supra). 
.. Advance Plans, supra note 8 at 16,563. 
.. See note 8 supra. 
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To date no agency rulings have been successfully brought before 
a court on appeal. In Power Authority of New York v. New York,69 
a ruling of the New York State Board on Electric Generation Sit-
ing and the Environ~ent requiring the applicant to submit infor-
mation on radiation health and safety impacts was challenged as 
an intrusion into a federally pre-empted area.70 The court held 
that standing alone the request did not conflict with NRC author-
ity because it did not amount to state regulation of radiation 
hazards.71 However, the court refused to reach the issue whether 
the use of such evidence as the basis of denial of certification 
would be pre-empted, finding that the constitutional issue was not 
ripe for review.72 Nevertheless in dictum the court stated, 
[i]t is not at all "plain" that the federal statutory scheme precludes a 
State from preferring fossil-fuel over nuclear power on the basis of rel-
ative environmental impact. Such an interpretation, which in effect re-
quires a state to accept a NRC licensed facility, far exceeds the holding 
of Northern States.78 
As the Wisconsin and the New York decisions indicate, the ex-
tent to which state agencies may give consideration to radiological 
health and safety evidence in a nuclear power plant licensing pro-
ceeding is a question that will not easily reach the courts. This fact 
belies, however, the significance of the issue as a determinant of 
where the ultimate policy-making with respect to nuclear power 
plant construction lies. Since the safety and health effects of nu-
clear generation constitutes one of the principal' objections to its 
•• (1979) UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 52,357 (11 22,799.01) (S.D.N.Y., 1979). 
TO The board's ruling was -based on Opinion No. 75-32, issued in Case No. 80003, supra 
note 63. 
71 The court drew support for its holding from a letter to the court from the NRC. Letter 
to the Court from Stephen F. Eilperin, Solicitor, (June 16, 1978). The letter stated: "Since 
the Siting Board's request for evidence and testimony does not, in our opinion, amount to 
State regulation of radiation hazards, the request, a fortiori, is not "directed toward protec-
tion against radiation hazards," and does not conflict with the Commission-State under-
standings." [d. at 2-3 . 
.. "This question will undoubtedly be better fit for judicial adjudication after the Siting 
Board has taken some action and the basis and scope of that action is known." (1979) UTIL. 
L. REP. (CCH) at 52,360. 
TO [d. at 52,359-60. On January 29, 1980, the New York Board on Electrical Generation 
Siting and the Environment denied the Long Island Lighting Company's application to con-
struct the Jamesport nuclear plants. The chairman of the board, Charles A. Zielinski, said 
that the "regulatory uncertainty" surrounding nuclear power since the accident at Three 
Mile Island "leaves us with substantial doubt about the wisdom of relying on a new nuclear 
plant." N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1980, at AI, B2 col. 3. 
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use as a power source, prohibiting a state from considering these 
effects may result in foisting nuclear power on the states against 
their will. On the other hand, it is not to be lightly inferred that 
the states may frustrate the national plan to promote the develop-
ment of nuclear power.74 Whether the decision-making power lies 
in the hands of the states or in the hands of the federal govern-
ment can only be answered by looking to the intent of Congress.7I 
III. THE PRE-EMPTION DOCTRINE 
The pre-emption doctrine takes its force from the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution which declares that "[t]his Constitu-
tion, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land. ''7. 
Juxtaposed to this is the declaration of the Tenth Amendment 
that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people."77 
As long as Congress has acted within the powers delegated to it 
under the Constitution, any state law that is in conflict with fed-
eral law is pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause.78 The exis-
tence of a conflict between federal and state law is a matter of stat-
utory construction. The pre-emption doctrine-essentially a 
judicial tool of statutory construction-may thus serve not only to 
give full effect to a demonstrated congressional intent to regulate 
in a particular field, but also to check federal intrusion into areas 
traditionally left to state control when Congress has not clearly es-
tablished its intent to do so. 
Since Congress rarely gives full consideration to the pre-emptive 
scope of its laws, and since in any event it is impossible for Con-
•• In Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Comm'n, 472 F. Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 
1979), see text at note 54, supra, the court held that this national policy required the pre-
emption of California Public Resources Code section 25524.2. [d. at 200. Noting that Con-
gress had expressed its intent to encourage the development and utilization of nuclear 
power, the court concluded that, "Congress' policy ... would decidedly be frustrated if all 
fifty states had statutes similar to California Public Resources Code section 25524.2." [d. at 
200. 
•• For the purposes of this article, it will be assumed that Congress has the power under 
the Constitution to impose nuclear power on the states. Professor Tribe, however, has sug-
gested otherwise. See Tribe, California Declines the Nuclear Gamble, supra note 33 at 721-
23. C{. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) . 
•• U.S. CONST., art. VI. 
•• [d. amend. X . 
•• See e.g., Fla. Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul 373 U.S. 132 (1963). 
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gress to foresee all potential federal-state conflicts, the doctrine in-
variably leaves to the courts many of the problems of defining the 
extent of the federal power that has been delegated. The Supreme 
Court's concepts of federalism are reflected in its degree of willing-
ness or reluctance to invalidate state laws. 
Pre-emption cases can be generally classified as falling into ei-
ther of two categories.78 First, the Court will hold the state law 
invalid where there is an actual conflict with federallaw.80 If the 
conflict is obvious, as where compliance with both laws is a physi-
cal impossibility, "a holding of federal exclusion of state law is in-
escapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design. "81 
Where the conflict is more subtle, however, the Court must decide 
whether the state law stands as an obstacle to the objectives of the 
federallaw.81 Cases of this type generally turn on how the Court 
interprets the statutes. In some instances minor conflicts have 
been upheld where other considerations weigh in favor of uphold-
ing the state law. This has been especially true in areas tradition-
ally controlled by the states, such as health and safety, criminal 
law, and contract law.83 
In the second category, the Court will invalidate state laws 
where the circumstances indicate that Congress intended to occupy 
the field of regulation to the exclusion of the states, even though 
there is no actual conflict between the state law and the federal 
law." Congressional intent can either be "expressed," in which 
case the issue may be resolved by resort to the statutory language 
and the legislative history,86 or it can be "implied."88 In determin-
ing whether Congress has implied that the federal government "oc-
cupy the field," the Court has set forth three factors that should be 
7. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). See generally, TRIBE, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, 376-91 (1978); Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Fed-
eralism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The Pre-
emption Doctrine). 
80 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). 
81 Fla. Lime and Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). 
U E.g., Jones v. Jtath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) . 
•• See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973); Fla. 
Lime and Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. 
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) . 
.. E.g., Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61 (1954) . 
.. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 233-234 (1947); see generally Frank-
furter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947) . 
.. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N.Y. Lab. ReI. Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947); Napier v. Atlantic 
Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926). 
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considered: 
[The congressional] purpose may be evidenced in several ways. The 
scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable 
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement 
it. Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal inter-
est is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude 
enforcement of state laws of the same subject. Likewise the object 
sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obliga-
tions imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.87 
To these three factors may be added a fourth consideration, 
namely the intent of Congress as revealed by the act as it is carried 
into effect by the administrative agency.88 
This four factor "test" has not been uniformly or even fre-
quently applied per se,89 but at least in the occupation-of-the-field 
cases, one or more of the considerations enumerated in Rice have 
always been applied. Beneath these four factors are various policy 
considerations that weigh significantly in the Court's decision, pol-
icy considerations that are also to a certain degree, relevant to the 
"conflict" cases.90 For example, if the subject matter being regu-
lated is such that the state's interest in regulating the field is out-
weighed by the need for a uniform system of national regulation, 
the Court will find that Congress has "impliedly" pre-empted the 
field.91 Likewise, the relation of the subject matter to areas tradi-
tionally controlled by the federal government on the one hand, or 
by the states on the other, is also significant to the Court's analy-
sis. In First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power 
.7 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), quoted in Ray v. Atlantic 
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978) (citations omitted) . 
.. See Northern States Power Co. v. Minn. 447 F.2d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir. 1971) . 
•• Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 
(1978); see generally The Preemption Doctrine, supra note 79. 
to In theory, the Supremacy Clause commands that the state law should be overridden in 
all cases where there is a demonstrable conflict regardless of the strength of the state inter-
ests. However, the court has frequently ignored minor conflicts where thfl.l"e are strong coun-
tervailing policy considerations. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 
440 (1960); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973) . 
• , See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How,) 299 (1851) ("Whatever sub-
jects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan 
of regulation may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by 
Congress." 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 
624 (1973) (holding that a city ordinance placing an 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. curfew on jet flights 
from the Hollywood-Burbank Airport was pre-empted by federal control over aviation). 
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Comm'n,92 for example, an applicant to the Federal Power Com-
mission seeking a license to construct a dam to produce hydroelec-
tric power was blocked by the refusal of the state of Iowa to issue 
the state-required permit. In holding that the Federal Power Act 
pre-empted the state law,98 the Court gave recognition to the 
strong tradition of federal control over navigable waters: "Students 
of our legal evolution know how this Court interpreted the com-
merce clause of the Constitution to lift navigable waters of the 
United States out of local controls and into the domain of federal 
control."H 
Similarly, where the state regulates in an area traditionally 
within the control of the state police power, the Court has been 
reluctant to override state law. The Court has been consistent in 
maintaining that where Congress has "legislated in a field which 
the States have traditionally occupied . . . we start with the as-
sumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to 
be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress."911 Thus where the state of Florida 
sought to protect its citizens and beaches from the hazards of oil 
spills within its territorial waters by imposing strict liability on vi-
olators, the Court held that federal regulation of the same subject 
did not require pre-emption.96 
The above principles constitute the general approach taken by 
the Supreme Court since the 1930's. Like other principles of con-
stitutional decision-making they have not always been consistently 
applied, and the Court over the years has vacillated in its willing-
ness to find in favor of pre-emption. Prior to the 1930's, the Court 
was of the somewhat extreme view that the mere fact of congres-
sional regulation in a particular field inherently excluded concur-
rent regulation by the states.97 When this approach was abandoned 
.. 328 U.S. 152 (1946) . 
.. [d. at 181-83. 
M [d. at 173, quoting Northwest Airlines v. Minn., 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944). 
H Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) . 
.. Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973). The Court declined to 
find pre-emption despite the fact that some aspects of the subject matter arguably involved 
an area of traditional federal control (admiralty) and despite the fact that the federal act 
was generally directed at the same objectives (prevention of oil spills); see also Kelly v. 
Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding that state inspection requirements for vessels are 
not pre-empted by the federal inspection laws); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 
U.S. 440 (1960) (city ordinance regulating smoke emissions from ships' boilers not pre-
empted by federal licensing standards) . 
.., See generally The Preemption Doctrine, supra note 79 at 626-30. 
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in the 1930's, the Court instead required a clear showing of con-
gressional intent before it would find a state law invalid.98 Later, 
the Hines v. Davidowitz99 and Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator CO.100 
cases of the 1940's marked a shift toward a greater tendency in 
favor of finding implied pre-emption, and this approach seemed to 
dominate through the '50's and the '60'S.101 Commentators today 
agree that the '70's have seen a return to the state-oriented ap-
proach of the '30'S,102 and the cases indeed seem to support this 
view. loa 
In putting the burden on Congress to express its intent more 
clearly, the recent cases have qualified some of the factors enumer-
ated in Rice that have been the traditional indicators of an implied 
congressional intent. l04 In N. Y. Dept. of Social Services v. Dub-
lino,lO& for example, the challengers argued that the pervasive 
character of the federal Social Security Act amendments left no 
room for concurrent state regulation. The Court replied: 
We reject, to begin with, the contention that pre-emption is to be 
inferred merely from the comprehensive character of the federal work 
incentive provisions . . . . The subjects of modern social and regula-
tory legislation often by their very nature require intricate and com-
plex responses from Congress, but without Congress necessarily in-
tending its enactment as the exclusive means of meeting the 
problem. 1011 
In a similar vein, the Court has indicated that the mere fact that 
the state statute and the federal law seek to obtain the same objec-
tives does not by itself require a finding of an "inferred" congres-
sional intent to pre-empt.107 
The result of the modern cases has been to shift to Congress the 
.. [d. at 630-39. 
N 312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
'00 331 U.S. 218 (1947). 
'0' See generally The Preemption Doctrine, supra note 79 at 636-39. 
'0' See, e.g., id.; Tribe, California Declines the Nuclear Gamble, supra note 45 at 686-87. 
'0. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973); N.Y. Dept. of 
Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973); Fla. Lime and Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 
U.S. 132 (1963). 
'04 See text at note 87 supra. 
'0' 413 U.S. 405 (1973). 
, .. [d. at 415. 
'07 "This Court is generally reluctant to infer pre-emption [citations omitted), and it 
would be particularly inappropriate to do so in this case [merely) because the basic purpose 
of the state statute and the Robinson-Patman Act are similar." Exxon Corp. v. Governor of 
Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978). 
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burden of expressing its intent clearly. It is important to note that 
this establishes an important principle of federalism, one that puts 
on Congress rather than on the courts the burden of defining the 
reach of federal power. loa As an unelected body, the Supreme 
Court is poorly equipped to assess the competing interests of fed-
eral and state governments. Congress, on the other hand, in its 
unique role of simultaneously representing national and state in-
terests, can better elaborate the scope of its laws and can better 
adjust and readjust their reach through the legislative process. The 
pre-emption doctrine is more appropriately used with restraint so 
that Congress, as the more qualified of the branches, will have the 
greater role in deciding where the proper balance of federal-state 
power should lie. lOB By refusing to "infer" lightly a congressional 
intent to pre-empt, the Court forces Congress to clarify its inten-
tions. If the Court errs on the side of not finding a clear enough 
intent to pre-empt when in fact the intent was there, Congress can 
subsequently make itself heard.110 But where legislative ambiguity 
has indicated a failure to resolve issues relating to the federal-state 
balance of powers, the Court should refrain from substituting its 
own views of what the proper balance should be. The Supremacy 
Clause is more properly invoked as a consequence of statutory con-
struction than as a result of judicial conclusions as to proper fed-
eral-state relations.lll 
'08 Note, Pre-emption IJ8 a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. 
L. REv. 208, 224-25 (1959). 
'08 [d. 
110 For example, in Maun v. United States, 347 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1965), the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the Atomic Energy Act did not preclude the town of Woodside, 
California, from prohibiting the AEC from building overhead transmission lines for its nu-
clear research center. Shortly thereafter, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act to pro-
vide that "this section ahall not be deemed to confer upon any Federal, State, or local 
agency any authority to regulate, control, or restrict any activities of the Commission." Act 
of August 24, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-135, 79 Stat. 551 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1976». 
III See generally, TRmB, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 242-44 (1978); Note, Pre-emption as a 
Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959). 
This approach to the pre-emption doctrine, which favors upholding the state law in 
doubtful cases, is consistent with the command of the Tenth Amendment. See text at note 
77 supra. 
In discussing the respective areas of federal and state constitutional powers, Alexander 
Hamilton in the Federalist Papers stated that state authority would be superseded by fed-
eral authority if similar authority in the states would be "absolutely and totally contradic-
tory and repugnant." "I use these terms," he wrote, "to distinguish this ... case from 
another which might appear to resemble it, but which would, in fact, be essentially different. 
I mean where the exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction might be productive of occasional 
interferences in the policy of any branch of administration, but would not imply any direct 
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IV. THE PRE-EMPTION DOCTRINE APPLIED TO STATE SITING LAWS 
Under the principles set out above it is first necessary to deter-
mine whether there is an actual conflict between the authority of a 
state to make a comparative health and safety evaluation and the 
regulatory authority of the NRC under the Atomic Energy Act. If 
there is no actual conflict between the federal and state regulatory 
schemes it is then necessary to determine whether there is a con-
flict of purpose, i.e., whether Congress has intended that the fed-
eral government occupy this area of regulation to the exclusion of 
concurrent state regulation. 
A. No Actual Conflict 
The state and federal statutory schemes present no actual con-
flict. There is nothing in the Atomic Energy Act that on its face 
precludes state consideration of radiation hazards; likewise there is 
nothing in the Act that indicates whether the federal government 
or the states have the ultimate say as to whether nuclear power is 
preferable to other types of power plants. Furthermore, compliance 
by a utility with both the federal and state regulatory schemes is 
by no means impossible-to the contrary it is repetitive. Thus 
there is nothing in the federal and state regulatory schemes that 
per se requires the invalidation of state decisions based on a com-
parative health and safety analysis. 
There would arguably be a conflict of purpose where the NRC 
issued a construction permit and the state thereafter denied a cer-
tificate of public convenience and necessity on the grounds that 
nuclear power is not as safe as other methods of electric power 
generation. Whether there would indeed be a conflict of purpose 
between the state and federal regulatory schemes in such a situa-
tion depends on what Congress has intended to accomplish 
through its legislation. An inquiry into the text and legislative his-
tory of the 1954 Act is the first step in determining the congres-
sional intent. 
contradiction or repugnancy in point of constitutional authority." THE FEDERALIST, No. 32, 
at 200 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original). See Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. 
WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 545 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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B. Expressed Congressional Intent 
I. The 1954 Act 
The broad purpose of the 1954 Act was to open up the atomic 
energy field to private industry.ll2 The objectives of the Act were 
twofold: llS to provide for a program to promote and encourage the 
development of a nuclear industry,U4 and to provide for a program 
of continued government regulation for the protection of the 
health and safety of the public. llli 
The AEC's promotional activities were directed toward govern-
ment-financed research and development programs designed to de-
velop a technology that would become practical for private com-
mercial use. The AEC was also authorized to provide financial 
incentives to attract private industry into the field. us Taken as a 
whole, the promotional provisions indicate an intent to create an 
economic and technological environment that would spur the de-
velopment of nuclear energy by private industry to the point where 
it could compete successfully in the market. 
The AEC's regulatory duties were designed to maintain tight 
government control over all nuclear activities through the Act's li-
censing provisions.ll7 The language of the licensing provisions is 
preventative in nature; they are designed to prevent any illicit use 
of nuclear materials and to minimize the hazards of radiation that 
could arise from such use.ll8 The issuance of a license was condi-
tioned on a negative finding: that there is a reasonable assurance 
that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered.ll8 
Generally speaking, the licensing provisions exhibit an intent to 
regulate the industry for that limited purpose.l2O 
112 42 U.S.C. 2013(d) (1976). 
113 The 1954 Act also deals extensively with international matters, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2151-
2166, and matters pertaining to patents and inventions, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2181-2190 (1976). 
These subjects are not within the scope of this article. 
"4 42 U.S.C. §§ 2013(a), 2013(d) (1976). 
116 42 U.S.C. § 2013(c) (1976). 
"8 Financial incentives included waiver of Commission charges for nuclear materials, per-
formance either without cost or at less than full cost in Commission laboratories of research 
and development, and support of research and development for specific energy projects. 
See, ATOMS AND THE LAW, supra note 18 at 1215. 
117 See ATOMS AND THE LAW, supra note 18 at 1207-11. 
"8 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2132, 2133 (1976) . 
... [d. § 2133(d) (1976). 
110 Senator Clinton P. Anderson, a principal author of the Act and a member of the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy, pointed out to the Senate that: 
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Although in theory the promotional provisions of the Act were 
separate from the regulatory provisions, the fact that the AEC was 
charged with performing both functions resulted, as a practical 
matter, in a built-in promotional feature of the regulatory 
scheme.l21 The dual functions of the AEC were separated in 1974 
by the creation of two separate agencies each to perform only one 
of those functions. 122 
The subject of federal-state relations was not given much atten-
tion by the 1954 Congress. Section 271123 was the sole provision 
addressing the subject. As originally enacted, it provided: "Nothing 
in this chapter shall be construed to affect the authority or regula-
tions of any Federal, State, or local agency with respect to the gen-
eration, sale, or transmission of electric power."IU 
At the time of Section 271's enactment many states had laws 
requiring that a utility obtain a certificate of public convenience 
and necessity before commencing construction of a power plant.121 
The usual ground for denying a certificate was that existing facili-
ties were adequate and that issuance of the certificate would result 
in duplication of facilities. us States were therefore actively en-
gaged in regulating the construction of electric power plants. 
The language of Section 271 is ambiguous as to whether this sort 
of state regulatory control over power plant construction was to be 
preserved. The legislative history of the 1954 Act, however, leaves 
little doubt but that the decision whether, as opposed to how, to 
build a commercial nuclear power plant was to be left to private 
The Commission has no special competence in the field of electric energy distribution 
and seeks no responsibility in that field. Its functions should be limited, as the bill con-
templates, to those areas in which the Commission does have special competence or re-
sponsibility. These areas include the review of design criteria, the supervision of con-
struction, and decisions on the technical qualifications of applicants to operate nuclear 
plants, on health and safety standards, and on security safeguards. 
100 CONGo REC. 10559 (July 15, 1954) (quoting a statement by Chairman Strauss of the 
AEC). See also ATOMS AND THE LAW, supra note 18, at 1005. 
111 See ATOMS AND THE LAW, supra note 18, at 1245. 
'88 Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233, as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1976). See note 
18 supra and text at notes 172-83 infra. 
'8' 1954 Act, ch. 1073 § 271, 68 Stat. 960. Section 271 was amended by Act of Aug. 24, 
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-135, 79 Stat. 551, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1976) . 
.. 4 [d. 
'8' E.g., Act 69 of 1929, ch. 209, p. 175, as amended MICH. STAT. ANN. § 22.142 (Callaghan 
1970); Act of June 29, 1921, Laws 1921, art. IV, § 55, as amended ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 111%, 
§ 56 (West 1966). See generally ATOMS AND THE LAW, supra note 18, at 853-55 . 
.. I See, e.g., Western Colo. Power CO. V. Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 159 Colo. 262, 411 P. 
2d 785 (1966); Pub. Util. Comm'n V. City of Loveland, 87 Colo. 556, 289 P. 1090 (1930). 
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industry or to those states that required the certificate of public 
convenience and necessity. In the committee debate on Section 271 
the following colloquy between Representative Sidney Yates 
(Chairman, Ill.), and Representative W. Sterling Cole (of New 
York) took place: 
Mr. Yates. In other words, the authority that is contained in this act 
. . . is only a preliminary grant and such a person must then go to the 
appropriate Federal or State agency in order to obtain a certificate of 
convenience and necessity in order to carry out the charter which is 
granted under the terms of the act; is that correct? 
Mr. Cole. The answer is in the affirmative.Ul7 
Statements by several other members of Congress indicate that 
this was the prevailing view. liB 
Although these remarks show that Congress meant to leave in-
tact the states' authority to issue or deny a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity, it is difficult to draw any broad conclu-
sions regarding state consideration of health and safety matters 
since state regulatory procedures at that time were mainly con-
cerned with cost and problems of duplication of facilities. Never-
theless it does illustrate a congressional intent to limit the scope of 
AEC jurisdiction and leave traditional state regulatory practices 
alone. 
Although there was little further debate on Section 271 other 
than the above colloquy and the brief references noted, the limited 
scope of the regulatory provisions of the 1954 Act was the subject 
of an inquiry made at the time the debates were going on. In a 
letter to Jerome K. Kuykendall, Chairman of the Federal Power 
Commission (FPC), Representative Holifield asked about the na-
ture of the FPC's regulatory control over hydroelectric power, and 
asked for suggestions concerning the applicability of such regula-
tory methods to the atomic energy field.129 Kuykendall's reply con-
sisted of an FPC statement which explained the FPC's method of 
regulation, requiring a determination that the project be "best 
11'1 100 CONGo !bc. 11689 (1954) . 
.. I See id. at 12015 (statements of Bourke Hickenlooper); Hearings on S. 3323 and H.R. 
8862 to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 
83d Cong., 2d Sess., 723 (1954) [hereinafter cited as 1954 Hearings), reprinted in II AEC 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY or THB ATOMIC ENERGY ACT or 1954 at 2361 [hereinafter cited as AEC 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY) (statement by Representative Chet Holifield). 
III Letter of June 9, 1954, reprinted in 1954 Hearings, supra note 128 at 1126, II AEC 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 128 at 2764. 
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adapted to a comprehensive plan"lso for utilization in the public 
interest, and which recommended a parallel approach for AEC li-
censing.lsl Kuykendall also submitted an analysis132 of the bill that 
was pending at the time. ISS The analysis was critical of the limited 
approach taken by the bill's licensing provisions: 
We believe, as was provided for in the issuance of licenses for hydro-
electric development under the Federal Power Act, that provision 
should also be made in any such legislation for the consideration of 
public and private interests in the production, transmission, and distri-
bution or utilization of electric power. 
If, on the other hand, it is decided that the consideration of such 
interests should be left to existing utility regulatory agencies operating 
as at present, any legislation with respect to the development of atomic 
power should be designed to facilitate and not hamper such 
regulation. 184 
The 1954 Act as passed indicates that Congress failed to follow 
the advice of the FPC. The Act authorizes the Commission to issue 
licenses on a non-exclusive basis to persons: 
(1) whose proposed activities will serve a useful purpose proportionate 
to the quantities of special nuclear material or source material to be 
utilized; (2) who are equipped to observe and who agree to observe 
such safety standards to protect health and to minimize danger to life 
or property as the Commission may by rule establish; and (3) who 
agree to make available to the Commission such technical information 
tao See 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1976). See also text at notes 29-33 supra. 
tal Summary of Possible Parallels Between Problems Dealt With in Existing Waterpower 
Legislation and Those Which May Warrant Consideration in Connection With Atomic En-
ergy Legislation, Letter of July 1, 1954, reprinted in 1954 Hearings, supra note 128 at 1127-
33, II AEC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 128 at 2765-71. One passage of the statement 
commented: 
[T]he grant of the privilege [of developing atomic energy] should depend not solely on 
the negative consideration that national defense will not be harmed, but on the affirma-
tive ground of benefit to the public interest in electric power and other products of the 
operation of nuclear reactors as well. 
[d. 1954 Hearings, 1128, II AEC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 2766. 
taO Excerpts From an Analysis Prepared on Behalf of the Federal Power Commission of 
the Provisions of H.R. 8862, 83d Congre88, Second Session, reprinted in 1954 Hearings, 
supra note 128 at 1129, II AEC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 128 at 2767. 
ISS S. 3323, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); H.R. 8862, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). The licens-
ing provisions of the bill (§ 103) discu88ed in the analysis were eventually enacted as section 
103 of the 1954 Act with minor changes. 
taO 1954 Hearings, supra note 128 at 1130, II AEC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 128 
at 2768 (quoting from the comments of Commissioner Dale E. Doty, member of the Federal 
Power Commi88ion). 
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and data concerning activities under such licenses as the Commission 
may determine necessary to promote the common defense and security 
and to protect the health and safety of the public. 1s11 
The Commission is directed to lise such information "only for 
the purpose of the common defense and security and to protect the 
health and safety of the public."13e Furthermore, the Commission 
shall not issue a license if it finds that "issuance of a license to 
such person would be inimical to the common defense and security 
or to the health and safety of the public."l37 No close reading of 
the statutory language is required to conclude that Congress did 
not confer upon the AEC the authority to determine whether the 
construction of a nuclear plant is preferable to other alternatives 
or whether one site location is better than another. The licensing 
provisions are of a negative sort: under the Act the Commission is 
merely required to find that the facility will not be so dangerous as 
to warrant denial of a license.l38 
The contrast to the type of regulatory authority over hydroelec-
tric power plants delegated to the FPC warrants attention here be-
cause it serves to clarify the important distinction between the 
... 42 u.s.c. § 2133(b) (1976). The "useful purpose" standard of subsection (1) was criti· 
cized by the FPC: 
The critical words "some useful purpose" avoid rather than enunciate a congressional 
determination of the policy to be followed . . . . 
The bill itself recognizes that "some useful purpose" is, as a practical matter, no real 
standard, for section 182, which prescribes the data to be furnished to the Commission 
so that it can be determined whether to issue a license, does not require any information 
whatsoever as to the applicant's purpose. 
1954 Hearings, supra note 128 at 1130-31, II AEC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 128 at 
2768-69. 
Section 102 of the 1954 Act also required the Commission to find that the type of facility 
"has been sufficiently developed to be of practical value for industrial or commercial pur-
poses" as a prerequisite for the issuance of licenses to that type of facility. The legislative 
history indicates that this section was retained from section 7(b) of the 1946 Act which had 
also required that any such finding also be reported to Congress with recommended regula-
tory legislation. The latter requirement was eliminated from H.R. 8862 as unnecessary in 
light of the existing channels of communication. 100 CONGo REc. 11713 (1954), reprinted in 
II AEC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 128 at 2929-30. Since the provision only related to 
any "type" of facility, and not to the specific plant, it thus has no bearing on the scope of 
the AEC's decision-making authority. See 1954 Hearings, supra note 128 at 327, II AEC 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 1961. Congress eliminated the section in 1970, Act of Dec. 19, 1970, 
Pub. L. No. 91-560, 84 Stat. 1472, finding it to be "neither practical nor of value," H.R . .REP. 
No. 91-1470, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4981, 
4993. 
, .. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(b) (1976) . 
... [d. § 2133(d) (1976). 
, .. [d. 
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type of regulatory authority typically vested in state siting agen-
cies-having the same "planning responsibility" approach as the 
FPC188-and the licensing authority conferred by the Atomic En-
ergy Act which is directed primarily towards health and safety 
matters. 140 
Although Section 271 preserved existing state regulatory author-
ity over power plants, the 1954 Congress most probably intended 
to pre-empt state authority with respect to those areas of the Com-
mission's technical expertise. Although the issue was essentially ig-
nored in the debates and hearings on the Act, the circumstances 
surrounding its passage were such that there is readily inferred an 
"intent" to pre-empt the field of reactor design, supervision of con-
struction, and other areas in which the Commission had special 
competence. An implied intent to pre-empt may be inferred from 
the fact that these areas were traditionally within the ambit of ex-
clusive federal control from its very beginning.141 Also the para-
mount concerns for the national security support the conclusion 
that a national system of control over the use and disposition of 
nuclear materials was envisioned. Furthermore, as a practical mat-
ter it was clear that the federal government had acquired by far 
the greatest expertise in radiation health and safety regula-
tion-another factor tending to support pre-emption in these 
areas. In 
, •• See text at notes 28-33 supra. 
I •• 42 U.S.C. § 2133 (1976). Several courts have cited First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. 
Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946), discussed at note 30, supra, as authority for 
the conclusion that the construction of a federally licensed power plant may not be prohib-
ited by a state licensing scheme. In re Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 1 Nuc. REG. 
REP. 16,128, 16,129 (11 20,018) (1975); Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Comm'n, 472 
F. Supp. 191, 200 (S.D. Cal. 1979). See also Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 13 at 449-50. 
The differences in scope between the regulatory jurisdiction of the FPC and that of the 
AEC show that reliance on First Iowa is misplaced. The fact that the regulatory approach of 
the FPC over hydroelectric power was considered and rejected by the 1954 Congress would 
seem to foreclose any broad conclusions that a state must permit construction of a nuclear 
power plant. The incorrectneaa of such a conclusion is demonstrated by the situation that is 
presented where a state finds that there is no need for the power that would be generated by 
the proposed plant. Under the Atomic Energy Act the NRC has no power to override such a 
state finding, and the NRC has indeed never asserted to the contrary. See text at notes 214-
215, infra. On the other hand, the Federal Power Act vests this decision in the FPC, and its 
determination is final and binding on the state. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a); City of Vanceburg v. 
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 571 F.2d 630 (1977). 
,., The observations made in the text herein relate to some of the traditional factors 
which support an inference of congreaaional intent to pre-empt a particular area. See text at 
note 87 supra. 
, •• See ATOMS AND THE LAW, supra note 18, at 1023-24. 
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2. The 1959 Amendments 
Between 1954 and 1959 the passage of a number of state laws 
regulating atomic energy for health and safety purposes accentu-
ated the need for an amendment to the 1954 Act with respect to 
federal-state cooperation.l43 In 1959 Congress amended the 1954 
Act to permit the AEC to enter into "turnover" agreements with 
the states in order to allow states to assume regulatory control over 
certain defined areas of jurisdiction.H4 
Enacted as Section 274, the amendments authorize the Commis-
sion to enter into agreements with the governor of any state pro-
viding for the discontinuance of the regulatory authority of the 
Commission with respect to byproduct materials, source materials, 
and/or special nuclear materials in quantities not sufficient to form 
a critical mass. HI The amendments principally apply to the use of 
small amounts of radioisopes, such as are used in certain medical, 
research and industrial activities, and do not apply to the licensing 
and regulation of nuclear reactors.HS Subsection (c) states, in part 
that "No such agreement shall provide for discontinuance of any 
Section 27l was amended in 1965 by a proviso which expressly prohibited the states from 
restricting the activities of the AEC. Act of Aug. 24, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-135, 79 Stat. 551, 
42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1976). Section 27l now reads: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect the authority or regulations of any 
Federal, State, or local agency with respect to the generation, sale, or transmission of 
electric power produced through the use of nuclear facilities licensed by the Commission: 
Provided, That this section shall not be deemed to confer upon any Federal, State, or 
local agency any authority to regulate, control, or restrict any activities of the 
Commission. 
[d. The amendment was in response to the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Maun v. United States, 347 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1965), which interpreted section 27l as sub-
jecting the AEC itself to local regulations. See a discussion of the case, supra at note 110. 
Messrs. Murphy and La Pierre, supra note 13, take the view that the 1965 amendment to 
section 27l is indicative of a congressional intent to pre-empt state and local regulation in 
all areas except regulation of rates and services. [d. at 408. The amendment, however, ex-
plicitly refers to activities of the Commission, and not to activities of AEC licensees. Fur-
thermore the House Report on the amendment states: 
This bill has nothing to do with regulatory control over radiation hazards pertaining to 
nuclear facilities licensed by AEC; this is covered by other provisions of the Atomic En-
ergy Act of 1954 which are left unimpaired by this bill. 
H.R. REP. No. 567, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, 
2780-81. It is clear that the amendment was not meant to affect regulation of AEC licensees, 
but only regulation of the AEC itself. I.. See note 20 supra. 
I •• Act of September 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, 73 Stat. 688, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 
2021 (1976). I., 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1976). 
I •• [d. § 2021(c)(l) (1976). 
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authority and the Commission shall retain authority and responsi-
bility with respect to regulation of (1) the construction and opera-
tion of any production or utilization facility .... "147 The term 
"utilization facility" includes commercial nuclear reactors.148 
In a fashion similar to that of the 1954 Congress, the issue of 
pre-emption was addressed in a short and ambiguous subsection. 
Subsection (k) provides: "Nothing in this section shall be con-
strued to affect the authority of any State, or local agency to regu-
late activities for purposes other than protection against radiation 
hazards. "14. 
In contrast to the negative approach of this section, the Senate 
Report explained the pre-emptive effect of the provision in more 
affirmative language. Discussing the approach of the amendments 
as a whole, the comments by the Joint Committee on Atomic En-
ergy state that "[t]he intent is to have the material regulated and 
licensed either by the Commission, or by the State and local gov-
ernments, but not by both."lIO In the section-by-section analysis, 
the Senate Report stated: 
Subsection (k) is intended to make it clear that the bill does not impair 
the State authority to regulate activities of AEC licensees for the mani-
fold health, safety and economic purposes other than radiation protec-
tion. As indicated elsewhere, the Commission has exclusive authority 
to regulate for protection against radiation hazards until such time as 
the State enters into an agreement with the Commission to assume 
such responsibility.1II1 
These comments demonstrate that it was the understanding of 
the Joint Committee that states would be pre-empted from assert-
ing regulatory control over those technical aspects of nuclear power 
plant regulation that were within the ambit of the AEC's regula-
tory activities. Beyond this, however, the intent of Congress was 
... Id. 
1 •• Id. § 2014(cc) (1976) . 
... Id. § 2021(k) (1976). The Northern States decision was based on an interpretation of 
subsection (k). Northern States Power Co. v. Minn., 447 F.2d 1143, 1149-52 (8th Cir. 1971). 
110 S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Seas., 4, 8 (1959) reprinted in U.S. CODE CONGo &: AD. 
NEWS 2879. It should be noted that this statement refers to the regulation of the small 
amounts of nuclear materials covered by subsection (b), and that therefore, any conclusions 
as to its applicability to nuclear power plants are necessarily rather speculative. But see 
Murphy &: La Pierre, supra note 13, at 401-50 (finding strong implications of pre-emption 
with respect to commercial reactors). 
lal S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Seas., reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONGo &: AD. 
NEWS 2882-83. 
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not made clear. Just what constitutes regulating "for protection 
against radiation hazards" was never defined. 
Ostensibly, the Senate Report statement and the language of 
subsection (k) imply that any state regulation that has as its pur-
pose the protection of the public from radiation hazards is pre-
empted. This purpose-oriented approach has been endorsed by 
several writers,1II1 and constitutes the basis of the argument that a 
state may not prohibit the construction of a nuclear power plant.lIIa 
A finding by a state regulatory agency that coal-fired generation is 
preferable to nuclear powered generation because of the radiation 
hazards associated with the latter would, under a broad interpreta-
tion of this section, be pre-empted since arguably some of its pur-
pose would be to prevent radiation hazards. 
The "purpose" test, however, must be applied with caution, lest 
irrational conclusions be drawn. Strictly applied, it would mean 
that the mere fact that the state seeks to ameliorate this danger in 
and of itself renders the state act unconstitutional; it would mean 
that the beneficent purpose of the state act standing alone is ille-
gal. The illogic of this reasoning requires that the implication of 
subsection (k)-the "purpose" test-not be taken at face value. 
Other reasons must be found before overriding state law-reasons 
such as those enumerated by the Supreme Court in the pre-emp-
tion cases previously discussed. Since the decision whether to au-
thorize construction of a particular plant was traditionally a deci-
sion regulated by the states, under the rule laid down in Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator CO.,I" no pre-emption should be found "unless 
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. "11111 Conse-
quently, if the "purpose" test is to be applied to judgments by 
state agencies on the comparative safety and health effects of a 
particular ~uclear plant,convincing evidence must be found that 
In E.g., Note, Application of the Preemption Doctrine to State Law8 Affecting Nuclear 
Power Plant8, 62 VA. L. REv. 738, 774-79 (1976); Murphy & La Pierre, 8upra note 13 at 449-
50. 
In See, e.g., Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Comm'n, 472 F. Supp. 191 (1979) 
(see text at notes 54-59 8upra). In rejecting the state's contention that the purpose of the 
California law was an economic one, the court seemed to endorse the "purpose" test: 
If [subsection) (k) is broadly interpreted to validate any state statute or regulation as 
long as there appears a stated purpose other than protection against radiation hazard, 
then the States would effectively be permitted to intrude into the pre-empted sphere 
and regulate radiation hazard under the guise of a permitted legislative purpose. 
[d. at 198. 
1 .. 331 U.S. 218 (1947). 
1" [d. at 230. 
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Congress intended such a result-evidence found either in the leg-
islative histories, or from other circumstances which imply such an 
intent. 
The AEC, which submitted the bill that was the backbone of the 
1959 Amendments, I" did not specifically address the question of 
what types of regulation were considered regulation "for protection 
against radiation hazards." However, in the AEC's analysis of the 
proposed amendments the Commission seemed to contemplate 
that its jurisdiction over nuclear power plants encompassed the 
technical problems of handling nuclear materials, and not the 
broader questions of energy policy that are raised by a comparative 
health and safety analysis. In describing the regulatory activities 
over which it would retain exclusive control, the AEC stated: 
Such activities include, but are not limited to, the possession and stor-
age at the site of the licensed activity of nuclear fuel and of source, 
special nuclear material and byproduct materials used or produced in 
the operation of the facility; the transportation of nuclear fuels to and 
from the reactor site; and the discharge of efBuent from the facility. II., 
The subcommittee hearings which discussed the 1959 Amend-
ments failed to clarify the scope of the AEC's exclusive jurisdic-
tion. During the hearings, the discussion on subsection (k) gener-
ally centered around the validity of the Minnesota health and 
safety laws. Minnesota had enacted a licensing scheme which 
granted the state Board of Health authority to regulate the design, 
operation and other safety aspects of nuclear power plants. 1 .. Even 
with respect to the Minnesota laws the AEC representative from 
the Office of the General Counsel was noncommittal when asked 
whether the intent of subsection (k) was to pre-empt these regula-
tions.lI• Presumably, however, the Joint Committee intended to 
1" S. 1987, H.R. 7214, 86th Cong., lst Sees. (1959), 105 CONGo REc. 8382-86 (1959) the 
proposed amendment. were introduced by Clinton P. Anderson, Chairman of the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy, together with the AEC letter of transmittal and analysis. 
Subsection (j) of the bill W88 eventually enacted 88 subsection (k) without change. Compare 
id. 105 CONGo REc. at 8386, with 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976). An amendment to the subsec-
tion W88 proposed during the hearings but W88 rejected by the Joint Committee. See note 
164, infra. 
10 105 CONGo REc. 8384 (1959). 
1" See Hearings Be/ore the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy On Federal-State Relation-
ships in the Atomic Energy Field, 86th Cong., lst Se88. 264-71 (1959) [hereinafter cited 88 
1959 Hearings]. 
1 .. [d. at 307 (statement. of Robert Lowenstein). 
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pre-empt such regulations. ISO 
The Joint Committee was confronted with the more difficult 
question of whether states could regulate the location of nuclear 
power plants, on at least two occasions. In one instance, Mr. Wil-
liam Berman and Mr. Lee Hydeman of the University of Michigan 
Law School offered a version of the amendments which in their 
view would vest in the AEC final authority to determine the loca-
tion of a commercial reactor. lSI They were critical of the bill in this 
respect, saying that "there is no clear statement of exclusive Fed-
eral jurisdiction of reactor licensing."ls2 The members of the Joint 
Committee offerred little response to their proposal (Representa-
tive Holifield exhibited some hostility to the idea)1s3 and did not 
incorporate any of their suggestions. 
The siting question was again raised during the discussion on 
subsection (k).IS. Robert Lowenstein of the AEC indicated that he 
thought subsection (k) pre-empted state control over site selec-
tion. ISG Chairman Anderson implied that he agreed with this posi-
tion, and Senator Hickenlooper implied to the contrary. ISS 
... See text at notes 99, 100 supra. The position adopted by the Joint Committee in its 
Comments to proposed section 274 (see notes 150, 151 supra) with respect to this type of 
state regulatory activity was foreshadowed in the following exchange: 
Mr. David Toll [AEC Staff Counsel). To my knowledge, [subsection (k» would not 
affect any State law. It might affect the regulations promulgated by the State of 
Minnesota. 
Chairman [Clinton P.) Anderson. Which requires something about the licensing of a 
reactor, which I think is just as wrong as it can be. 
Mr. [Curtis) Nelson [Director of Inspection, AEC). So do I. 
1959 Hearing, supra note 158, at 490. 
10. 1959 Hearings, supra note 158, at 400 . 
... [d. at 397 . 
••• [d. at 399, 404. 
... The discussion specifically concerned the omission from an earlier proposal of an 
amendment to subsection (k) which more explicitly pre-empted concurrent state regulation: 
It is the intention of this Act that State laws and regulations concerning the control of 
radiation hazards from byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials shall not be ap-
plicable except pursuant to an agreement entered into with the Commission pursuant to 
subsection (b): Provided, however, That States may adopt registration requirements for 
such materials and may inspect the use of such materials within the State to assure 
compliance with the Commission's regulations. 
[d. at 488. The sentence was omitted from the final version because, in the view of the AEC, 
its author, it merely stated what was substantially implicit in the bill without the sentence. 
[d. at 489. One representative of the AEC stated, however, that the sentence was omitted 
because its scope was unnecessarily broad. See statements of Mr. Neil Naiden, Deputy Gen-
eral Counsel, id. at 489-91. 
••• [d. at 492 . 
••• Comments of Chairman Anderson, id. at 491; comments of Senator Bourke Hick-
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Perhaps the only reasonable conclusion to be reached from these 
hearings is that nobody knew what subsection (k) really meant. In 
general, the hearings give the impression that the AEC and the 
Joint Committee members deliberately avoided defining the pre-
emptive scope of the Atomic Energy Act. Perhaps the attitude of 
the hearings is best summed up by the statement of Robert Low-
enstein of the AEC: 
We thought that this act without saying in so many words did make 
clear that there is preemption here, but we have tried to avoid defining 
the precise extent of that preemption, feeling that it is better to leave 
these kinds of detailed questions perhaps up to the courts later to be 
resolved. 117 
The legislative history of the 1959 amendments thus offers little 
solution to the question of the validity of state inquiries into radia-
tion health and safety matters. Perhaps the only thing that can be 
safely said is that the Northern States decision was correctly de-
cided. The conclusion that Congress intended to pre-empt states 
from setting their own radioactive emissions standards for nuclear 
power plants finds direct support in the Comments by the Joint 
Committee on the 1959 amendmentslla and in the AEC analysis of 
S. 1987.188 Reading into that decision, however, as certain state 
regulatory agencies have done,170 a finding of congressional intent 
to preclude state inquiries into radiation hazards for comparative 
purposes would extend pre-emption far beyond that contemplated 
by both the 1959 Congress and the Eighth Circuit Court that de-
cided Northern States. 
3. Subsequent Legislation171 
If the strong pre-emptive language of the legislative history of 
enlooper, id. at 494 . 
.... Id. at 308. 
... See text at notes 150, 151 supra . 
... See text at note 157 supra. The dissenting opinion in Northern States relies on the 
ambiguity of the discussion that took place during the hearings as proof that there was no 
clear intent to pre-empt concurrent state regulation. 447 F.2d at 1154-58. This would seem 
to give greater weight to the remarks made during the hearings than to those statements 
made in the Comments by the Joint Committee that accompanied the bill. See text at note 
151, supra. See also Murphy &: La Pierre, supra note 13, at 402 n.58. 
170 E.g., In re Petition for Approval of a Long-Range Forecast Filed by Northeast Nuclear 
Energy Co., Memorandum and Decision on Challenged Contentions Before the Siting Coun-
cil, EFSC No. 77-17A (Maaaachusetts Energy Facility Siting Council, Dec. 8, 1977). 
171 The Price-Anderson Act is beyond the acope of this article because of its tenuous rela-
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the 1959 amendments created any presumption in favor of pre-
emption, recent federal legislation has abrogated any such pre-
sumption. In 1974 Congress passed the Energy Reorganization 
Act,17I abolishing the AEC178 and creating in its place two separate 
agencies, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)17. and the 
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA).I7I 
The licensing and related regulatory responsibilities of the AEC 
were transferred to the NRC,!" and the research and development 
and other promotional functions were transferred to ERDA.177 
These changes were made in response to mounting criticism that 
the conflicting duties of the AEC of both promoting and regulating 
the nuclear industry resulted in an unwarranted pro-nuclear 
bias.17• In the congressional declaration of policy and purpose, the 
Act states that "the Congress finds that it is in the public interest 
that the licensing and related regulatory functions of the Atomic 
Energy Commission be separated from the performance of the 
tion to state regulation of location and type of fuel. However, it should be noted because it 
is illustrative of Congress' promotional objectives, and concerns an area which the federal 
government has more probably pre-empted. Enacted in 1957, Act of September 2, 1957, 
Pub. L. No. 85-256, § 4, 71 Stat. 576, as amended 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210 (West Supp. 1979), the 
Act provides that the liability of the operator of a nuclear reactor shall not exceed $560 
million in the event of an accident. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1976). The Act authorizes the AEC 
(now NRC) to set the amount of private "financial protection" which the licensee must 
maintain (currently $160 million, 10 C.F.R. § 140.11 (1980», and provides for a government 
indemnity to take effect above that amount up to the $560 million ceiling. 42 U.S.C. § 
2210(c) (1976). Strict liability is imposed on the licensee by providing that injured plaintiffs 
need only show that the accident in fact caused the radiation injury. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n) 
(1976); 10 C.F.R. § 140.91 (1980). 
Commentators generally agree that a state would be pre-empted for imposing higher lia-
bility requirements on the operator of a nuclear power plant. E.g., Note, Application of the 
Preemption Doctrine to State Laws Affecting Nuclear Power Plants, 62 VA. L. REv. 738 
(1976); Murphy & LaPierre, supra note 13. Since it is clear that "Congress' purpose was to 
remove the economic impediments in order to stimulate the private development of electric 
energy by nuclear power," Duke Power Co. v. Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 
59, 83 (1978), it seems equally clear that the attempt by a state to reimpose those same 
"economic impediments" would "[stand] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 
(1941). Providing for a favorable economic environment, however, does not constitute a con-
gressional finding that nuclear power is preferable to other sources of electrical generation . 
... Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233, as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1976) . 
... 42 U.S.C. § 5814(a) (1976) . 
... [d. § 5841. 
... [d. § 5811. 
1" [d. § 5841(f) . 
.. 7 [d. § 5814(c). 
17. S. REP. No. 93-980, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 5470, 5471, 5489 [hereinafter cited as [1974] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS]. 
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other functions of the Commission .... "179 The Senate Report 
states that "[t]he [Nuclear Regulatory] Commission will have 
solely regulatory responsibilities, in keeping with a basic purpose 
of this act to separate the regulatory functions of the Atomic En-
ergy Commission from its developmental and promotional func-
tions, which are transferred to ERDA."180 As regards the promo-
tional activities of ERDA, the Act stated that "the Congress 
intends that all possible sources of energy be developed consistent 
with warranted priorities."18l Although some of the language of the 
Act was modified by the conference committee to eliminate some 
anti-nuclear language in the Senate version, one of the unmistaka-
ble purposes of the Act was to eliminate the pro-nuclear bias that 
had existed previously.181 
It can no longer be said, therefore, that the licensing and regula-
tory provisions of the Atomic Energy Act have as their purpose the 
promotion of nuclear power.18S To the extent that a state regula-
tory scheme seeks to prevent any pro-nuclear bias that is built into 
the federal regulatory scheme, such a purpose would not run afoul 
of the Atomic Energy Act. Thus a state agency's finding that nu-
... 42 U.S.C. § 5801(c) (1976). 
180 (1974) u.s. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS, supra note 178 at 5483. 
181 42 u.S.C. § 5801(b) (1976). 
1 •• See, (1974) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, supra note 178 at 5489; CONF. REP. No. 93-
1445, reprinted in id. at 5538, 5539. See generally, Palfrey, Energy and the Environment: 
The Special Case of Nuclear Power, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1404-05 (1974); but see Mur-
phy & La Pierre, supra note 13 at 409, n.99. 
1'. In Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Comm'n, 472 F. Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 
1971), the court implied a promotional purpose into the licensing jurisdiction of the NRC. 
The court suggested that a state may not prohibit the construction of a federally licensed 
nuclear plant: 
[T)he power to regulate is not necessarily the power to prohibit. There seems little point 
in enacting an Atomic Energy Act and establishing a federal agency to promulgate exten-
sive and pervasive regulations on the subject of construction and operation of nuclear 
reactors and the disposal of nuclear waste if it is within the prerogative of the states to 
outlaw the use of atomic energy within their borders. 
[d. at 200. Since under the Atomic Energy Act the NRC is directed to issue licenses to 
applicants who meet NRC standards and whose projects will not be "inimical to the com-
mon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public," 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) 
(1976), the court's suggestion means that any federally approved plant shall be built regard-
less of whether it is needed, whether it is environmentally acceptable, or whether it is the 
most desirable means of generating electricity generally. Allowing the construction of a 
power plant under such circumstances constitutes a promotion of nuclear power via the 
licensing system. That the NRC in fact makes determinations with respect to need, environ-
mental compatability, and over-all impact pursuant to NEPA does not affect the allocation 
of power under the Atomic Energy Act. See text at notes 36-39 supra, and at notes 214, 215 
infra. 
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clear power is inferior to other methods of electric generation does 
not necessarily thwart the "full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress."II. This conclusion should not, however, be taken as apply-
ing to other state regulation that might discriminate against nu-
clear power. Absent an outright repeal of the promotional 
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, Congress can still be said to 
intend the development of nuclear power through ERDA (now the 
Department of Energy). Arguably, such a congressional purpose 
might be cited as support for the contention that any state legisla-
tion that discriminates against nuclear power is pre-empted.111 
Another piece of federal legislation which illustrates a non-pre-
emptive attitude on the part of Congress is Section 122 of the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.188 Under the Clean Air Act 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets air quality stan-
dards of various pollutants and standards of performance for major 
emitting facilities, which standards must be incorporated into a 
"state implementation plan" by each state,,17 Under Section 116, 
however, any state may adopt standards or emissions limitations 
which are more stringent than the federal standards. III Section 122 
of the 1977 Amendments brings the regulation of radioactive air 
pollution into this scenario by transferring from the NRC to the 
Administrator of the EPA and to the states the authority to set air 
quality standards and emissions limitations for radioactive pollu-
tants. IIB As the Conference Report that accompanied the bill 
states, "the provision' would not pre-empt States and localities 
from setting and enforcing stricter air pollution standards for radi-
ation than the Federal standards, and would not follow the holding 
of Northern States Power Co. v. State of Minnesota, [citation] in 
'84 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
'81 It could be argued that the California law challenged in Pacific Legal Foundation v. 
State Energy Comm'n, 472 F. Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1971), which prohibits nuclear power 
plant construction unless there exists a demonstrated technology for the disposal of nuclear 
wastes, discriminates against nuclear power. A state siting agency might find that serious air 
pollution problems and a lack of readily available coal supplies in a particular region weigh 
in favor of nuclear power despite the lack of a nuclear waste disposal technology. Neverthe-
less the agency would be prohibited from authorizing the plant's construction because of the 
California law. Such a result might be construed as an unreasonable restraint on the devel-
opment and utilization of nuclear energy. 
'" 42 U.S.C.A. § 7422 (West Supp. 1978) (hereinafter cited as section 122). 
'.7 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7409-7412 (West Supp. 1978). 
'" [d. § 7416. 
, .. [d. § 7422. 
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the context of radioactive air pollution.m90 
The 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act demonstrate a 
changed attitude on the part of Congress with respect to the state 
interests in regulating to protect against radiation hazards. In au-
thorizing states to set stricter emissions standards than those set 
by the Administrator of the EPA, the amendments in theory con-
fer on the states the power to regulate nuclear power out of exis-
tence by means of prohibitively strict standards.191 It should be 
noted, however, that as a practical matter the thought is largely 
academic. Because nuclear plants produce radioactive emissions in 
quantities that are approximately equal to those of coal-fired 
plants of comparable size,191 state emission standards that would 
be prohibitive as to nuclear power plants would also be prohibitive 
when applied to coal-fired plants. Since it is unlikely that states 
will choose to close down a probable majority of their power 
plants, it may be inappropriate to read into the 1977 Amendments 
any congressional intent regarding state regulation of nuclear 
power in general. Nevertheless, if any inference can be drawn at 
all, it is in the direction of greater state participation in the area. 
Some general conclusions can be drawn from the federal laws 
and legislative histories discussed above. Congress most surely in-
tended to leave intact state licensing power under laws requiring 
the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity. 
On the other hand, Congress also most likely intended to pre-empt 
state regulation of those areas in which the AEC was actively en-
gaged in regulating, i.e., power plant design, construction and oper-
ation in matters concerned with the hazards of radiation. However, 
as regards the decisions of choice of location and fuel type, the 
congressional manifestations of intent are at best ambiguous. Con-
gress' failure to address the problem is not surprising in light of 
the fact that these decisions were until recently left to the private 
utility companies with only the ultimate result subject to state or 
federal approval. 
100 Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee on Conference, H.R. REP. No. 564, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 143 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, 1502, 
1523-24. 
,., The California Attorney General has opined to the contrary. 61 Qp. CAL. A'M"Y GEN. 
159, 175 (1978); criticized in Tribe, California Declines the Nuclear Gamble, supra note 45, 
at 699 n.104. 
, •• See In re Union Electric Co., Mo. Pub. Servo Comm'n, No. 18,117 (March 14, 1975) at 
31. 
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C. Implied Congressional Intent 
Thus far, attention has been given to the expressed manifesta-
tions of congressional intent. A number of important policy consid-
erations, however, must be taken into account before reaching any 
conclusions as to the application of the pre-emption doctrine to 
state siting laws. 
By failing to provide for a "comprehensive plan" of regulation 
comparable to Section 803 of the Federal Power Act, Ie. Congress 
left a gap in the regulatory scheme of the Atomic Energy Act: that 
of choosing the best location and type of generation. The question 
thus presented is whether Congress left room for the states to fill 
this gap. In the absence of any expressed congressional intent on 
the subject, a finding of pre-emption must rest on a finding of an 
implied intent on the part of Congress that these decisions, at least 
with respect to health and safety matters, be left free from state 
regulation. 
There are two arguments why such a congressional intent might 
be implied. The first is that the promotional objectives of Congress 
indicate an intent that at least with respect to radiation hazards 
these choices be left free from state regulations so as to spur 
greater development of the nuclear industry. The second is that 
the NRC is better qualified to regulate these matters because of its 
expertise in the field of radiation hazards. 
With respect to the first argument, it is clear that Congress has 
intended to promote the development of nuclear energy. 1M The 
question is whether it is appropriate to imply an intent to promote 
it in this manner. Pre-empting states from considering health and 
safety impacts for comparative purposes creates the anomalous re-
sult of a state decision making process that ignores certain unde-
sirable features of one type of technology. 
In a state proceeding, where different technologies are "compet-
ing" against each other for state approval, the failure to consider 
the disadvantages of one type of technology results in a lop-sided 
approach, one that is unfair with respect to the other technologies. 
Thus if congressional intent to pre-empt this area is to be implied, 
it would require the conclusion that Congress intended that nu-
clear power be given unwarranted priority over alternative energy 
sources-in violation of the expressed purposes of the Energy Re-
IN 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1976). See text at notes 129-140 supra. 
1 .. 42 U.S.C. § 2013 (1976). See text at note 14 supra. 
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organization Act of 1974. lea While this result is avoided in the 
NRC licensing process by virtue of the comparative analysis re-
quired under NEP A, that analysis is not a part of NRC jurisdic-
tion under the Atomic Energy Act. lee It cannot be said, therefore, 
that pre-emptive federal law cures the imbalance in the state 
proceeding. 
To find that the Atomic Energy Act pre-empts the health and 
safety aspect of a state's comparative evaluation process would be 
to infer a built-in promotional feature of the Act's licensing provi-
sions. The explicit purpose of the Energy Reorganization Act of 
1974, however, was to separate the promotional and regulatory 
functions of the AEC.le7 It is thus unreasonable to suggest that 
Congress contemplated the promotion of nuclear power at the ex-
pense of other energy sources and conservation. To the contrary, 
Congress has, in a number of laws, stressed the importance of de-
veloping non-nuclear power as well. lee 
,n See, 42 U.S.C. § 5801(b) (1976) (quoted in text at note 181 supra). 
'" The fact that the gap in the licensing provisions of the Atomic Energy Act is filled 
pursuant to NEP A has no bearing on the reach of federal pre-emption under the Atomic 
Energy Act. See text at notes 38-39, supra. The purpose of NEPA was to ensure that Fed-
eral agencies give adequate attention to the environmental consequences of their actions, 
not to expand the scope of federal power. Thus it is stressed that for the purposes of deter-
mining the extent of federal pre-emption, NEP A should be ignored and consideration given 
only to NRC jurisdiction as conferred by the Atomic Energy Act and the Energy Reorgani-
zation Act of 1974. 
187 [d. § 5801(c). 
IN The Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974,42 U.S.C. §§ 
5901-5917 (1976), requires the Administrator of ERDA (now the Secretary of Energy, see 
note 1l, supra) to develop a comprehensive plan and program for research and demonstra-
tion of nonnuclear energy sources. [d. § 5903. In the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 
1975,42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (1976), CongreBB expreBBed its desire "to conserve energy sup-
plies through energy conservation programs," and to "increase the supply of fossil fuels in 
the United States through price incentives and production requirements." [d. §§ 6201(3), 
6201(4). In the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 
(1976), Congress stated its finding that "the need exists to develop alternative energy 
sources for public and private consumption in order to reduce our dependence on such 
sources as pertroleum products, natural gas, nuclear and hydro-electric generation." [d. § 
6901(d)(2). The Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352 
(Supp. I 1977), states that it is the congressional purpose "to create and implement a com-
prehensive energy conservation strategy that will receive the highest priority in the national 
energy program," and "to place major emphasis on the development and commercial use of 
solar, geothermal, recycling and other technologies using renewable energy resources." [d. § 
71l2(4), (6). The National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8201-8278 
(West Supp. 1979), likewise states that it is the congressional purpose "to reduce the growth 
in demand for energy in the United States, and to conserve nonrenewable energy resources 
produced in this Nation and elsewhere .... " [d. § 8201(b). See also Energy Tax Act of 
1978, 26 U.S.C.A. § 44C (West Supp. 1979) (allowing tax credits for energy conservation 
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One of the reasons expressed by the majority in Northern States 
for finding in favor of pre-emption, was that" 'AEC-manufacturer-
utility cooperative efforts at design improvements and at standard-
ization would be hampered by the existence of dual regulation.' "188 
It should be noted that the authority to preclude nuclear power 
plant construction on the basis of a comparative health and safety 
analysis does not affect NRC efforts at design improvements or 
standardization. Since the requirements imposed by the state sit-
ing laws are only that nuclear energy compete against other tech-
nologies in the regulatory arena, no unreasonable hindrance of in-
dustrial development or commerce is presented. 
With respect to the argument that the NRC is the better quali-
fied agency for deciding whether a proposed plant should be built 
and where, there are a number of considerations involved in these 
decisions which are better addressed by a state agency. In deter-
mining the location of a nuclear plant, a state agency will be more 
cognizant of local land use policies and hence more qualified to 
decide whether the proposed location might be more adaptable to 
some other use. For example, a state agency could more easily than 
a federal agency coordinate its activities with the policies of a state 
coastal zone management program under the Coastal Zone Man-
agement Act.IOO 
expenditures and renewable energy source expenditures); Public Utility Regulatory Policies 
Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2645 (West Supp. 1979) (establishing a program "providing for 
increased conservation of electric energy," id. § 2601(1»; Energy Conservation and Produc-
tion Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6892 (1976) (directing the Administrator to develop proposals 
"designed to encourage energy conservation, and minimize the need for new electrical gener-
ating capacity." Id. § 6803(a». 
1" 447 F.2d 1143, 1154 (8th Cir. 1971) (quoting Helman, Preemption: Approaching Fed-
eral-State Conflict over Licensing Nuclear Power Plants, 51 MARQ. L. REv. 43, 67 (1967». 
- 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-1464 (West Supp. 1979). The Coastal Zone Management Act en-
courages states, through financial incentives of federal grants-in-aid, to set up programs to 
protect and preserve the coastal zone. Section 307(c) of the Act requires any applicant for a 
federal license whose licensed activity would affect the coastal zone to obtain a certification 
from the state "that the proposed activity complies with the state's approved program 
.... " Id. § 1456(c)(3)(A). Thus an applicant for a license to construct a nuclear plant in 
that state's coastal zone must obtain such a certification before commencing construction: 
Id. 
[N]o license or permit shall be granted by the Federal agency until the state or its desig-
nated agency has concurred with the applicant's certification or until, by the state's fail-
ure to act, the concurrence is conclusively presumed, unless the Secretary, on his own 
initiative or upon appeal by the applicant, finds, after providing a reasonable opportu-
nity for detailed comments from the Federal agency involved and from the state, that 
the activity is consistent with the objectives of this chapter or is otherwise necessary in 
the interests of national security. 
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Another consideration involved in choosing a site is its political 
acceptibility. Many accept the technical competence of the NRC to 
set standards for the safe siting of a nuclear facility. But when 
choosing among a number of acceptable sites the assurances of the 
federal government are not likely to assuage the fears of those liv-
ing nearby. A state agency, on the other hand, being more suscepti-
ble to local pressure,IOl would be expected to choose the site that is 
least objectionable; at least the decision, even if unpopular, would 
come from an agency responsible to locally elected politicians. 
The NRC is likewise not well suited for determining what type 
of technology should be employed. As Peter Strauss, former Gen-
eral Counsel to the NRC, has pointed out, the NRC may be well 
equipped to assess the health and safety impacts of nuclear power, 
but it is ill-equipped to assess in detail the health and safety im-
pacts of coal, geothermal, or oil-fired generation for purposes of 
comparison.lol Furthermore, the NRC is incapable of accurately 
assessing alternatives to the proposed action when it has no au-
thority to implement any of those alternatives. A federal agency 
can only speculate as to the likelihood that a state government will 
undertake the conservation measures that would eliminate the ne-
cessity of additional generating capacity.203 
Selecting an appropriate technology also requires consideration 
of the relative availability of natural resources. A state with serious 
air pollution problems, a lack of coal, and plentiful water resources 
may prefer nuclear power; a state with clean air, a good supply of 
coal and a scarcity of water might prefer a coal fired plant. In con-
sidering such factors, a state agency will be better able to coordi-
nate its activities with other state environmental agencies. For ex-
ample state plans to meet state air and water quality standards 
under the Clean Air ActiN and Clean Water Act2011 will need to be 
considered in the decision. The best means of meeting these stan-
dards are state decisions, not federal ones. 
Admittedly the problem of availability of resources does not in-
•• , In Advance Plans, supra note 8, the Wisconsin Public Service Commission took note 
of the fact that "there is public and political opposition to nuclear waste disposal 
sites .... " Id. at 16,565 . 
••• Strauss, The NRC Role and Plant Siting, 4 J. CONTEMPT. L. 96, 107 (1977). The argu-
ments made in the text between notes 200-03 are discussed in greater detail in Mr. Strauss' 
article . 
••• See, NRC STAFF FEDERAL/STATE SITING STUDY, supra note 1, at 5-3 through 5-5 . 
... 42 V.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West Supp. 1979). See text at notes 186-90 supra . 
••• 33 V.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1976). 
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volve the pre-emption issue, but it is important to recognize that 
the location and type of fuel decisions should be made by one 
body, and should not be fragmented among agencies with different 
allegiances. The comparative health and safety impacts of different 
methods of electric generation are an integral part of these deci-
sions and cannot be logically isolated from other considerations of 
need for power, cost, and environmental impact. In these matters 
the NRC role is better cast as an advisory body with veto power 
rather than as one embroiled in the controversial task of choosing 
among several alternatives. 
More fundamentally, it is questionable whether decisions of gen-
erally state-wide impact and interest are best made by a federal 
agency. 1M The NRC in particular is an unlikely candidate for 
reaching an objective decision. A disinterested evaluation of alter-
natives is too much to expect of an agency committed to the regu-
lation of a single industry. Regardless of whether the NRC has in-
deed been "captured" by the industry it regulates,I07 its credibility 
as a neutral arbiter has, as a practical matter, eroded beyond the 
point where public confidence in its decisions can be fully 
restored.lo8 
Admittedly, allowing the states to determine whether and where 
to build a nuclear power plant might inhibit the implementation of 
a national energy policy. No mechanism of federal oversight would 
exist to pre-empt states that act against that national interest. 
However, as this article has demonstrated, Congress has not de-
clared that it is the nation's energy policy to prefer nuclear power 
over other methods of electric generationjlo8 nor has Congress de-
clared that the NRC shall be the agency to implement any such 
policy. no To imply that Congress intended such a result at the ex-
... It is not contended that the NRC is not suited to regulate matters whose impacts 
extend beyond state boundaries. For example, federal regulation of power plant design crite-
ria allows for standardization within the industry, thus facilitating interstate commerce. 
Also, since a serious accident could create hazards which extend to states other than that in 
which the plant is located, the federal government has a legitimate interest in setting safety 
standards in order to prevent harm to the public health and safety . 
... See, L. JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL or ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, 11-14 (1965); contra Jaf-
fee, The Administrative Agency and Environmental Control, 20 Bur. L. REv. 231 (1970). 
... See Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, 2 
Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH) 16,744 (~ 20,128) (1979). 
lOt See note 198 supra. 
"0 In Niagra Mohawk Power Corp., 3 ATOM. EN. L. REP. (CCH) 17,817 (~ 11,709.04), the 
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board questioned the appropriateness of its passing on mat-
ters of energy policy: 
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pense of public health and safety is simply illogical. Perhaps if and 
when Congress chooses to implement a defined national energy 
policy it may choose to pre-empt state autonomy in the matter. 
But in the absence of any such policy, states should not default on 
the question to an agency that is neither authorized nor equipped 
to make such decisions. 
Perhaps the more important indications of what "intent" might 
be implied on the part of Congress are the past and present actions 
of the AEC and NRC themselves. In interpreting "regulation of 
radiation hazards" both agencies have followed the congressional 
intent that these responsibilities are mainly concerned with "the 
construction and operation of production or utilization facilities, 
including reactors. "1111 They have never taken the position that the 
Atomic Energy Act empowered them to make policy decisions with 
regard to whether and where to build a nuclear plant.2111 The reluc-
tance of the NRC to enter into such policy decision-making was 
amply illustrated by its "crabbed interpretation"1113 of NEPA prior 
to the Calvert Cliffs decision. 
Furthermore, the NRC has expressly recognized that the states 
may prohibit the construction of nuclear plants despite NRC ap-
proval of such construction. In Matter of Consolidated Edison 
Company of New York, Inc.,nf the NRC Atomic Safety and Li-
censing Appeal Board stated: 
In ALAB-399, we were confronted with a narrow and novel question. 
We did not have the case of a State (or one of its political subdivisions) 
refusing to authorize the construction of a nuclear power plant on envi-
ronmental grounds. Clearly, such a refusal would not conflict with Fed-
A question can be raised of whether it is appropriate for the Agency to consider the need 
for power on a utility's system in an individual licensing proceeding. . . . It might be 
proper if there was a national or regional energy policy, to determine in a licensing pro-
ceeding if a utility is complying with such policy. However, the Board does not know of 
any energy policy on these matters, and it does not seem appropriate for licensing 
boards, in ruling on permits for construction and operation of individual plants, to set 
energy policy on a case-by-case basis. 
Id. at 17,817-10 (supporting opinion). 
"" S. REP. No. 870, 86th Congo 1st Sess., reprinted in (1959) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 2872, 2880-81. 
III "The selection of a reactor site is the responsibility of the company proposing to build 
the reactor." U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Licensing of Power Reactors, reprinted in 
Hearings before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, on Licensing and Regulation of Nu-
clear Reactors, 9Ist Congo 1st Sess. (1967), pt. I at 285. See also text at note 214 infra. 
"" Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
I .. 2 Nuc. REG. REP. (CCH) 28,411 ('II 30,265.02) (1978). 
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eral law. Although, by virtue of the National Environmental Policy 
Act, this Commission must make an environmental assessment of all 
proposals to construct and operate nuclear power plants, nothing in 
that Act requires a State to place its own stamp of approval on a spe-
cific proposal simply because it has passed Federal muster. To the con-
trary, States (and, upon appropriate delegation, their political subdivi-
sions) retain the right, even in the face of the issuance of an NRC 
construction permit, to preclude construction on such bases as a lack of 
need for additional generating capacity or the environmental unac-
ceptability of the proposed facility or site.216 . 
The NRC itself thus recognizes that its decision-making role 
pursuant to NEPA is not pre-emptive of concurrent state author-
ity. It is not a long leap of logic to the conclusion that the NRC's 
comparative health and safety analysis, also conducted solely pur-
suant to NEP A, is likewise not pre-emptive of a similar state 
evaluation. 
As a result of its forced entrance into this field the NRC has 
been advocating legislative changes that would allow it to defer to 
state agencies on such matters when these state agencies have 
made determinations on the basis of a NEPA-type analysis. In 
1977 the NRC published a staff report from the NRC Office of 
State Programs. SIS The study was in large part a response to the 
problems created by duplicative review procedures and the ensuing 
licensing delays. It urged that the states should be encouraged to 
undertake the NEPA-type analysis and that the ensuing state de-
cisions should be binding on the NRC.217 Although the study did 
not address the issue of state consideration of radiation impacts, it 
did say that under the envisioned legislation the "NRC would con-
tinue to be responsible for all matters of radiation health and 
safety,"Sl8 and that "the State would accept as binding NRC radio-
.n ld . 
•• 8 NRC STAFF FEDERAL/STATE SITING STUDY, supra note 1. 
'.7 The NRC Staff suggested: 
[WJe believe that a better approach would be to ask the Congress for an amendment to 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 which would permit the Federal govern-
ment to accept State site certification including environmental impact statement (EIS) 
preparation under certain carefully considered Federal guidelines. . . . [IJt would be de-
sirable if the Congress were to amend Federal Law to make it clear that the lead Federal 
agency must accept as binding in its deliberations "need for power" determinations val-
idly certified by the States. . . . 
ld. at 1-8, 1-9. 
uo ld. at 1-5. 
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logical health and safety findings and requirements. "IUI It then 
stated that: 
NRC activities would be confined to radiation health and safety (i.e., 
matters concerned with the nuclear steam supply system, balance-of-
plant, and their safety-related interactions with the demography and 
geology of the site environs), the common defense and security, and 
antitrust as specified in section 1050 of the Atomic Energy Act.lIliO 
Many of the proposals of this study were incorporated into Pres-
ident Carter's proposed Nuclear Siting and Licensing Act of 1978 
which was submitted as an amendment to the Atomic Energy 
Act.m Under Section 195 of the bill, the NRC would be prohibited 
from issuing any license or permit unless the state, pursuant to 
NEP A -style hearings, certifies that there is a need for the facility 
and that it is environmentally acceptable. III The bill contemplates 
that the entire NEP A procedure and determination, including the 
comparative analysis of health and safety impacts, are to be put in 
the hands of the state agency.1IlI8 At the same time the bill also 
states that it does not purport to alter the scope of federal or state 
authority with respect to radiation hazards.lIl14 The apparent im-
III [d. at 2-2. 
II. [d. at 2-3. 
III H.R. 11704, 95th Cong., 2d Seas., (1978); S. 2775, 95th Cong., 2nd Seaa., [hereinafter 
cited as S. 2775), 124 CONGo &Bc. 4259 (1978) (the House and Senate bill are the same). The 
bill was attacked both by industry and environmentalists and failed to clear Congress in 
1978. The 96th Congreaa, preoccupied by the Three Mile Island accident, did not reconsider 
the bill. See 1978 CONGo Q. ALMANAc, 698-99. 
"'S. 2775, supra note 221, § 195(a)(3), 124 CONGo REC. at 4263. 
II. [d. at § 195(d) (see text at note 225, infra). Section 195(a)(5) states: 
Evaluations and determinations made by a State under this section and under its ap-
proved program shall not be subject to further review by the Commiaaion and shall not 
be subject to challenge either before the Commission or in a Federal Court re-
view of Commission action under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as 
amended. 
The "approved program" refers to section 195(e) which requires that in order for the Act 
to apply to a state, the state must make its determinations pursuant to an "approved pro-
gram" which, in addition to requiring compliance with NEPA, aaaures that provisions for 
public participation will be provided, that proper coordination between federal and state 
agencies will exist, and that regional factors will be considered in the proceedings. 
II. Section 195(d) provides: 
Nothing in this section shall a1fect in any way the Commiaaion's authority to protect 
the public health and safety and the common defense and security pursuant to the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as 
amended, to [sic, should be "nor shall") be construed as vesting the States with any such 
authority not contained in existing law .... 
[d. § 195(d). 
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port of these provisions is that, at least in the opinion of the bill's 
drafters, such decisions are presently within the scope of state 
power under the existing Atomic Energy Act, and are not pre-
empted areas. 
V. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 
The foregoing analyses justify the conclusion that a state siting 
agency, in considering an application to construct a nuclear facil-
ity, should admit into its hearing and give full consideration to evi-
dence regarding the safety and health effects of the proposed 
plant. Having reached this conclusion it is properly asked whether 
and to what extent a state siting agency should limit the scope of 
its inquiry to avoid "regulating" nuclear power in matters that are 
clearly pre-empted by federal law. A state finding that a nuclear 
plant is unacceptable because of an alleged defect in the design of 
its cooling system is certainly an intrusion into NRC affairs. 
A practical solution, one that allows proper deference to NRC 
authority, is offered by the proposed Nuclear Siting and Licensing 
Act of 1978. Section 195(d) provides: 
[T]he Commission shall, pursuant to the provisions of the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, assess the environmen-
tal impacts of the operation of the facility and prepare and forward to 
the State a statement of its analysis and conclusions of the nature and 
extent of such impacts. The State shall include the radiological safety 
impacts as set forth by the Commission in its statement of conclusions 
in the State's determination regarding environmental acceptability 
provided for by this section. The Commission's statement of conclu-
sions of the nature and extent of radiological impacts shall not be sub-
ject to review in any State administrative or judicial proceeding.m 
Under this scenario, the NRC submits data and findings regarding 
the "nature and extent of radiological impacts," while the state 
agency makes "evaluations and determinations" on the basis of the 
NRC data and findings. lIIe 
••• S. 2775, supra note 139 . 
••• The New York Public Service Commission has used this approach in Case 80003, 
supra note 63. 
[W]e shall ... require the applicant to reference all applicable NRC standards, regula-
tions, generic documents and recent decisions which assess radiological health and safety 
related impacts. The applicant also should provide witnesses competent to explain these 
standards and regulations and should, through the testimony of these witnesses, relate 
those impacts and risks to the proposed facilities and sites and to the findings that are 
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Evidentiary disputes that arise in the state hearing can be re-
solved by looking to the purpose of the proponent in offering the 
evidence, or by looking at whether admission and consideration of 
the evidence would tend to involve the state agency in "regulating" 
nuclear power for noncomparative purposes of radiation health 
and safety. If there were statutory language similar to the pro-
posed Nuclear Siting and Licensing Act of 1978, reference could be 
made to whether the evidence tends to refute the NRC's assess-
ment of "the nature and extent of radiological impact,"22'7 thus 
falling within NRC jurisdiction, or whether it concerns an "evalua-
tion"22s of data for comparative purposes, thus falling within the 
scope of permissible state authority. 
For example, assuming a full submission of environmental and 
health and safety impact data by the NRC, the hearing officer 
should not admit independent evidence regarding the contents and 
quantities of radioactive emissions that would be discharged by the 
plant during its normal operation or in the event of a postulated 
accident. Neither should he admit independent evidence on the bi-
ological effects of such radiation. He could, however, receive into 
evidence the NRC data and take notice of past accidents to other 
plants and the reasons for their occurrence and determine that 
there is a significant risk of an accident in the event the plant is 
constructed. Similarly, the hearing officer should not receive evi-
dence challenging the ability of the applicant's waste storage tanks 
required under Section 146 of the Public Service Law. 
To the extent that this additional evidence does not provide sufficient information on 
how the applicable NRC standards will be met by the applicant's specific proposal and 
the environmental effects of such compliance, further evidence may be required to com-
plete the record for the Board's determinations. The record should be sufficient to per-
mit the Board, for example, to evaluate and compare the impacts and risks associated 
with effluents from each alternative as well as the residue disposal, fuel transportation, 
decommissioning and security requirements of each alternative. Id. at 17. Necessarily, 
evidence on the health and safety impacts of fossil fuel and other available alternatives 
also must be received and evaluated. Id. n.l. 
Parties should be allowed sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the applicant's ex-
pert testimony on these matters, and to introduce such testimony of their own. Question-
ing that seeks to explain relevant NRC standards and determinations and to relate those 
findings to the specific proposals in this case should be allowed. Direct testimony or 
cross-examination that challenges or refutes regulatory decisions of the NRC on the sub-
ject of protection against radiation hazards, however, is not required and should not be 
permitted in this proceeding. 
Id. at 18. 
I .. S. 2775, supra note 221, § 195(d). 
"·Id. 
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to safely contain radioactive waste, since such an inquiry would 
tend to intrude into the NRC's authority to regulate the design 
and construction of the power plants. Yet, given the NRC data on 
that storage system, the state may take cognizance of the federal 
government's lack of a permanent waste disposal program and de-
termine that there will be an increasing risk to public health and 
safety if large amounts of radioactive wastes are stored at the site. 
There is no claim that these criteria are well defined or easily 
administered. Yet if the NRC performs its task properly it is un-
likely that the state will err on the side of admitting evidence that 
should not be admitted. Nor is it likely that, given the vast 
amounts of data on environmental impact, one or two improper 
rulings will prejudice the result. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of considering this evidence 
is its impact on public confidence in the decision. To the layman it 
is undoubtedly preposterous to think that a state could approve 
construction of a nuclear power plant without any consideration of 
its impact on public health and safety. State siting laws are a nec-
essary step in bringing the public's interest to bear before any 
commitment is made to such an enormous undertaking. States that 
have these laws should use them to their fullest and should refrain 
from abdicating to the NRC on the all-important issue of compara-
tive health and safety impacts. If one of the consequences of the 
state's considerations is duplicative hearings, such problems will 
likely be solved by Congress before long or can be alleviated by 
joint protocol agreements. 
Electric power plant construction promises to become more and 
more of a political issue at the state and local level. If the public is 
to have any faith in the decision-making process, if not the deci-
sion itself, that process should be properly administered by the 
agency that is closer to the people affected: the state agency, not 
the NRC. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The scope of this inquiry has been narrow: whether or not the 
Atomic Energy Act pre-empts state siting agencies from precluding 
nuclear power plant construction on the basis of a finding that nu-
clear power is not as safe as other sources of electical gen-
eration. 
When Congress passed the Act in 1954, it was not its intent to 
involve the federal government in the logistics of comparing one 
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type of technology to another, or one location to another, and de-
ciding which is best. Instead, both Congress and the NRC have 
expressed their understanding that the decisions with respect to 
the environmental acceptability of the plant and the need for the 
power remain within the traditional powers of the states. A com-
parative assessment of the health and safety impacts of a power 
plant is too closely related to these other decisions to be logically 
segregated from the state decision-making process. It follows that a 
state decision based on a comparative health and safety analysis 
should not be viewed as regulating "for purposes . . . [of] protec-
tion against radiation hazards," so as to invoke the sanctions of the 
pre-emption doctrine. Numerous manifestations of congressional 
intent and traditional notions of federalism suggest that the pre-
emptive areas of NRC jurisdiction is limited to those licensing and 
other regulatory areas that the Atomic Energy Act delegates to 
NRC control, i.e., plant design, construction, operation, and other 
technical matters. Viewed in its proper perspective the compara-
tive health and safety evaluation falls outside of the ambit of fed-
eral authority, and takes on the broader purpose of regulating in 
order to choose the most acceptable method of generating 
electricity. 
